35. “What do I have in common with the Jews?” Alienation What do I have in common with the Jews? I hardly have anything in common with them, and therefore I can calmly stand aside; here is a situation that allows me to take a breath. Franz Kafka (1883–1924), Diaries; cit. by Robert Alter, "When Tradition

2. The problem of the common good in post-socialist Russia In Russia, the concept of the common good in its legal (and state-legal) sense and meaning has not received, with rare exceptions, any widespread use, has not become a noticeable and significant part and

The process of formation of ethics began in the middle of the first millennium BC in Ancient Greece, India, and China. The term “ethics” itself (from the ancient Greek ethika, ethos - disposition, habit) was introduced into scientific circulation by Aristotle, who wrote such works as “Nicomachean Ethics”, “Great Ethics”, etc.

But he should not be considered the “first ethicist”. Even before Aristotle (384-322 BC), his teacher, Plato (428-348 BC), as well as Plato’s teacher, Socrates (469-399), actively dealt with various problems of morality. . BC.). In a word, in the early century BC. ethical research begins to occupy an important place in spiritual culture. Of course, the emergence of interest in these studies was not accidental, but was a consequence of the socio-economic and spiritual development of mankind. In the previous period, over thousands of years, primary mental material was accumulated, which was consolidated mainly in oral folk art - in myths, fairy tales, religious ideas of primitive society, in proverbs and sayings, and in which the first attempts were made to somehow reflect and comprehend relationships between people, the relationship between man and nature, to imagine the place of man in the World. Further, the beginning of the process of the formation of ethics was also facilitated by the abrupt change in social life that took place in the middle of the first millennium BC. e. All the more strengthened state power supplanted tribal relations, old traditions, and customs. There was a need to form new guidelines, ideals, new mechanisms for regulating relations between people. In response to this need to understand a new way of life, ethics appeared. It is no coincidence that many ancient thinkers emphasized the practical orientation of ethics. As Aristotle noted, the goal of ethical teaching is “not knowledge, but actions.” Moral teaching was most often understood as worldly wisdom, which required a certain harmony, order, and measure. Morality was viewed through the lens of virtue.

Hence, it is quite logical that the attention that ancient Greek thinkers paid to the consideration of virtues. A whole series of Plato’s dialogues are devoted to the analysis of various manifestations of virtues, comprehension of the essence of virtue as such. Many virtues were comprehensively considered in the works of Aristotle and the Stoics (Zeno, Seneca, Epictetus, etc.). And even earlier, one might say, the first European moralist Gesnod (late 8th century BC - early 7th century BC) in the poem “Works and Days” gives a detailed, emotional description of virtues and vices. Among the first, he highlights frugality, hard work, punctuality, etc.

Attempts were made to somehow systematize the virtues to make them easier to navigate. Thus, Plato identifies four basic, cardinal virtues: wisdom, courage, moderation and justice. Later, in fact, these same basic virtues were emphasized by the Stoics. Aristotle believed that there are two main groups of virtues: dianoetic (mental, associated with the activity of the mind) - wisdom, prudence, intelligence, and ethical (associated with the activity of the will) - courage, poise, generosity, etc.

At the same time, the ancient Greek philosopher believed that every virtue is a mean between two extremes. Thus, modesty is the middle ground between shamelessness and shyness. Self-esteem is the middle ground between self-will and sycophancy. Truthfulness is the middle ground between pretense and boasting. A similar characteristic is given to quite a few virtues. It should be noted that ideas about the golden mean are also found in the culture of Ancient India and Ancient China.

It has long been noted that in the culture of antiquity one can find the beginnings of almost all directions of philosophy, including moral philosophy, which were developed in later times. Thus, the sophists Protagoras (481-411 BC), Gorgias (483-375 BC) and others can be considered the founders of ethical relativism (from the Latin relativus - relative). The predecessors of the Sophists, who largely shared the ideas of ancient mythology, believed that the entire universe and man exist according to the same laws. The cosmos was even somewhat similar to the human body. Protagoras and his like-minded people were actually the first to declare that the laws of nature differ significantly from the laws of society. If the former exist objectively, then the latter are established by people themselves, taking into account their own interests. The sophists often pointed out the diversity of morals and made hasty conclusions about the relativity of good and evil. They often asserted that one virtue belongs to a statesman, another to a craftsman, and a third to a warrior. All this led to the idea of ​​instability, vagueness of moral prescriptions and, naturally, the possibility of violating them.

The opponent of the Sophists in a number of respects was Socrates (469-399 BC), who should rightfully be considered one of the founders of ethical rationalism (from the Latin rationalis - reasonable). Socrates sought to find a reliable basis for moral laws. In his opinion,

an individual does evil only out of ignorance. By his own will, a person never commits unseemly acts. Nothing will force someone who knows what is bad and what is good to do bad. It turned out that Socrates reduced virtue to the knowledge of virtue. In a word, for Socrates all virtues are permeated with rationality.

Ethical rationalism received its logical conclusion in the doctrine of Socrates' student - Plato. The latter gave concepts (ideas) about virtues an independent existence and ontologized them. According to Plato’s views, there is a special, supersensible world of ideas, which has true existence, and the earthly world is only a pale, inaccurate and imperfect copy of this higher world, in which the central place is occupied by the idea of ​​good. Before it entered the body (the prison of the soul), the human soul lived in this beautiful world and directly contemplated the ideas of good, justice, nobility, etc. In earthly life, the soul recalls what was known and directly contemplated in the supersensible world of ideas.

In antiquity, such a movement as eudaimonism (from the ancient Greek eudamonia - happiness, bliss) arose, which consisted in the desire to establish harmony between virtue and the pursuit of happiness. The position of eudaimonism was shared by many ancient thinkers - Socrates, Democritus, Plato, etc. As Aristotle noted, “to call happiness the highest good seems to be something generally accepted.” It was assumed that a happy person strives for fair, good deeds, and in turn, good deeds lead to happiness and a good mood.

In the writings of a number of ancient thinkers, eudaimonism was often intertwined with hedonism (from the ancient Greek hedone - pleasure), which interprets that virtuous behavior should be combined with experiences of pleasure, and vicious behavior with suffering. The founders of hedonism are usually considered Democritus, Epicurus, Aristippus (435-356 BC).

To a certain extent, eudaimonism and hedonism were opposed by askism, which connected the moral life of a person with self-restraint of sensual aspirations and pleasures. Of course, these restrictions should not be considered as an end in themselves, but only as a means of achieving the highest moral values. Elements of asceticism are not difficult to detect in the teachings of the Cynics and Stoics. Antisthenes (435-370 BC) is considered the founder of Cynicism. But, perhaps, his student Diogenes (404-323 BC) gained legendary fame.

Zeno (336-264 BC) is considered the founder of Stoicism. But the most famous were the works of representatives of Roman Stoicism - Seneca (3 BC - 65 AD), Epictetus (50-138), Marcus Aurelius (121-180 rr.). They also preached the need to renounce sensual pleasures and strive for peace of mind. Marcus Aurelius taught about the frailty and fragility of earthly existence. Earthly values ​​are short-lived, perishable, deceptive and cannot be the basis of human happiness. Moreover, a person, according to the Stoics, is not able to change anything in the surrounding reality, and he can only submit to fate (“the one who walks is drawn by fate, the one who resists is dragged”). The task of philosophy is to help a person accept the blows of fate.

Thus, we can say that the thinkers of antiquity considered many problems of morality and created the cultural foundation that largely predetermined the development of ethics in subsequent centuries.

The immediate successor, albeit rather one-sided, of ancient culture was the ethics of the Middle Ages (V-XV centuries), which perceived the culture of antiquity mainly through the prism of Christian dogmas. In the teachings of Christian thinkers it is not difficult to see echoes of a number of positions of Stoicism, the teachings of Plato and, to a lesser extent, Aristotle and some other philosophers of antiquity. However, the culture of agility was distinguished by a rather broad view of man and allowed the coexistence of the most

different opinions about the world and man. The Christian world, especially in the first centuries of its existence, was quite strict about the purity of faith. Theocentrism dominated in the ethical studies of Christians, i.e. everything was viewed through the prism of the relationship to God, checked for compliance with the Holy Scriptures and the decrees of the councils. As a result, a noticeably new understanding of man was formed. In Christ's Sermon on the Mount, humility, patience, humility, meekness, mercy, and even love for enemies are affirmed as the most important virtues. A significant place in Christian ethics is given to such a virtue as love of God. The very concept of love is ontologized: “God is love.” It is perhaps worth noting one more feature of Christian teaching - this is the idea of ​​​​universal sinfulness and the need for mass repentance.

As an undoubtedly positive thing, one should point out the strengthening of the personal principle in the moral teaching of Christianity, which addressed every human person, regardless of its social status, and spoke of the equality of all before God. The strengthening of the personal principle was also facilitated by the image of Christ - the God-man, the Superpersonality, who walked the earthly path and suffered for the sins of every person.

One of the central problems of any moral philosophy is the problem of the origin, the nature of morality. And here we must admit that on this issue the opinions of Christian thinkers of various confessions practically coincide: they all talk about the divine nature of morality, proceeding from one of the most important dogmas, according to which God is the creator and Provider of the visible and invisible world.

Already the first Christian thinkers (fathers and teachers of the church) argued in one way or another that a person receives moral convictions from God in two ways. First: in the process of creating the soul, God puts into it certain moral feelings and ideas. It turns out that an individual appears in this world already with certain moral inclinations, at least.

This moral disposition is called natural moral law. And the natural moral law is supplemented by the revealed moral law, i.e. those commandments and regulations that are set out in the Bible.

The fathers and teachers of the church emphasized the role of faith in a person’s moral life, and in their classifications of virtues they considered faith, hope, and love to be the most important.

Thus, in the Middle Ages, when there was total dominance of religion and the church, the most important moral problems were solved in a specific way - through the prism of religious dogmas, in the interests of the church.

The era of modern times is characterized by profound changes in the spiritual, economic, and political spheres. Although the position of religion still remains quite strong, religious reforms are shaking such European countries as Germany, England, France, etc. A new variety of Christianity is emerging - Protestantism, which from the very beginning took on a rationalistic character; Church rituals are simplified, and a person’s daily life is morally elevated as a form of serving God.

Although the positions of religion in modern times remain very strong, still spiritual, incl. and the religious life of society becomes more diverse. Firstly, as we have already noted, a variety of directions of Protestantism are emerging. Secondly, in modern times various forms of free thought have become widespread: atheism, deism, skepticism, pantheism, etc. Accordingly, some questions of moral theory are interpreted somewhat differently. Thus, the skeptics M. Montaigne and P. Bayle admitted the possibility of the existence of morality independent of religion and even stated that an atheist could be a moral being.

A significant part of modern thinkers tried to find the origins of morality in the human mind, in his nature.

B XVII-XVIII centuries. The theory of rational egoism becomes widespread (Spinoza, Helvetius, Holbach, etc.). B XIX century it was supported by L. Feuerbach, N. Chernyshevsky and others. According to this theory, it is simply unprofitable for a person to lead an immoral lifestyle, because people will respond to his atrocities in the same way (according to the proverb: “what comes around, so will it respond”). And of course, it is beneficial for a person to fight against everything that interferes with his own happiness and the happiness of his loved ones. In comparison with the Middle Ages, ethical quests are distinguished by incomparably greater diversity and multidirectionality, which made it possible to create a certain theoretical foundation for the moral philosophy of subsequent generations. At the end of the 18th century. Through the efforts of many thinkers, ethics acquired an independent status, revealed in many ways the specifics of the object of its research (morality), and created a fairly developed conceptual apparatus.

The ethical thought of the end of the 19th century and the entire 20th century presented a rather motley picture. Based on the achievements of her predecessors, she examines the eternal problems of man from various ideological positions (religious and materialistic), with varying degrees of use of the achievements of sciences such as psychology, genetics, sociology, history, etc. Those new situations are not equally illuminated in the light of higher moral values , which are generated by modern HTP. Reviewing this period, it is worth highlighting the spiritual quest of F.M. Dostoevsky, L.N. Tolstoy, B.C. Solovyova, S.H. Bulgakova, N.A. Berdyaev and other outstanding Russian thinkers who paid great attention to moral issues. As C.H. wrote at the beginning of the 20th century. Bulgakov, in our days, of all philosophical problems, the ethical problem comes first and has a decisive influence on the entire development of philosophical thought.

It is traditionally believed that philosophy includes ontologies (the science of being), epistemology (the science of knowledge) and ethics (the science of morality).

Ethics is not only a normative science, prescribing what to do in certain cases, but also a theoretical teaching that explains the nature of morality, the complex and contradictory world of moral relations, and the highest aspirations of man.

Abdusalam Abdulkerimovich Guseinov

GREAT MORALISTS
Content
ETHICS AND MORALITY 3

Etymology and history of terms: ethics, morality, morality -

Features of morality 6

Paradoxes of morality 16

Virtue and happiness 19

CONFUCIUS: ETHICS OF RITUAL 22

The place of ethics in the teachings of Confucius 28

Ren: philanthropy 30

Lee: Ritual 33

Junzi: noble husband 38

BUDDHA: CONQUER YOURSELF 45

Buddha's Golden Mean 51

Four Noble Truths 55

Beyond good and evil 59

^ MOSES: TEN COMMANDMENTS 65

Life and Mission of Moses 66

The legislation of Moses, its meaning and main

Principles 74

The Decalogue as a Moral Code 80

Justice and Mercy 84

^ JESUS ​​CHRIST: LOVE YOUR ENEMIES 86

Man and God 87

Good News 91

"My kingdom is not of this world" 95

"Be ye perfect, even as your Father is perfect

Demon" 98

"How I have loved you

"And I tell you..." 109

Mercy and Justice 112

"I Whitewashed the World" 117

^ MUHAMMED: THERE IS NO GOD BUT ALLAH 120

Birth of the Prophet 121

Sermon 127

Battle for Faith 131

True Faith 134

Divine predestination and human freedom 138

The Last Judgment, Hell and Heaven 145

Five foundations of a devout Muslim 149

The originality of the ethics of the Koran 152

^ SOCRATES: I KNOW THAT I KNOW NOTHING 158

The Life and Death of Socrates 159

The unity of eudaimonism and intellectualism 165

How people think is how they live 168

He who is not virtuous is not wise 173

^ EPICURUS: LIVE UNDERSTANDING 178

Happiness as Serenity 181

Freedom from suffering 184

Freedom from fears 187

Freedom from society 192

^ L. N. TOLSTOY: NON-RESISTANCE TO EVIL WITH VIOLENCE 196

The rebirth of Tolstoy 197

What is hidden behind the question about the meaning of life? 204

God, freedom, good 210

Five Commandments of Christianity 216

Non-resistance as a manifestation of the law of love 218

Non-resistance is the law 223

Why do people hold on to the old? 226

ALBERT SCHWEITZER: REVERENCE FOR LIFE.... 232

Schweitzer's identity 233

Ethics is the basis of culture 242

^ MORALITY AND CIVILIZATION 256

What do great moralists have in common? 257

Counterweight to civilization 260

Two historical images of morality 264

APPLICATIONS 272

From "Lun Yu". -

From the Dhammapada..278

From the Pentateuch 282

From the Gospel of Matthew..286

From the Koran....290

About Socrates....305

Plato. Crito -

Sayings of Diogenes Laertius about Socrates 314

Epicurus. Letter to Menoeceus 316

Main thoughts 319

L.P. Tolstoy. Sayings 323

Thou shalt not kill 324

The Kingdom of God is within you 328

A. Schweitzer. The emergence of the doctrine of reverence for life and its significance for our culture 334

Abdusalam Abdulkerimovich Guseinov GREAT MORALISTS

Head of the editorial office V. G. Golobokov

Editors L. V. Blinnikov, Zh. P. Kryuchkova

Art editor O. N. Zaitseva

Technical editor E. Yu. Kulikova

LR No. 010273 dated December 10, 1992. Delivered and set 04/10/95. Signed for publication on May 12, 1995. Format 84 x1081/1. Printing paper No. 2. Time typeface. Offset printing. Conditional oven l. 18.69. Academic ed. l. 20.67. Circulation 15,000 copies. Order No. 732.017

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^ ETHICS AND MORALITY
Ethics is the science of morality. This definition is widespread; almost all ethics textbooks begin with it. However, it does not stand up to logical criticism. Definitions of this type - through genus and specific difference - assume that the meaning of an unknown concept (in our case, ethics) is revealed through the known (morality) and that the second (defining) does not depend on the first (defining). The concept of morality does not satisfy these requirements, because terminologically it is synonymous with ethics and substantially depends on it in content. Thus, the definition “ethics is the science of morality” turns out to be vulnerable in two respects at once: it is tautological and contains a vicious circle. Is this a coincidence?

Etymology and history of terms: ethics, morality, morality

The term "ethics" is of ancient Greek origin. It originates from the word ethos, which in ancient times meant a place of residence - a human dwelling, an animal's lair, a bird's nest. It was used in this meaning by Homer. Later, this word acquires a new meaning - the stable nature of any phenomenon, including the character, internal disposition of living beings. In this meaning it is widely used in philosophy. Empedocles talks about the ethos of the primary elements. Heraclitus speaks about the ethos of man, meaning what is translated into Russian by the words “way of life”, “character”: “The character of a person is his demon.” Along with the new meaning, the word “ethos” acquires a normative connotation, denoting such a stable nature of the phenomenon, which at the same time acts as a model.

The shift and deepening of the meaning of the word “ethos” (from location to character, sustainable nature) is significant: here one can see the dependence of the character, sustainable nature of humans and animals on their cohabitation and community life.

Aristotle, starting from the word “ethos” in the meaning of character, inner nature, disposition, formed the adjective “ethical” or “ethos” (ethicos) - relating to ethos. With it, he designated a special class of qualities related to a person’s character, describing his perfect state - ethical virtues. In the terminological designation and meaningful description of ethical virtues, Aristotle also refers to the term “habit” (ethos), which differs from the term ethos in the meaning of character only by one first letter (epsilon, the fifth letter of the Greek alphabet, instead of ethos, the seventh letter). Ethical virtues (courage, moderation, generosity and others) differ both from the natural properties of a person, affects, and from the qualities of his mind (dianoetic virtues). Already from the adjective “ethical” Aristotle came to the noun “ethics”, which, on the one hand, is a generalization of the corresponding class of virtues, and on the other, a designation of the field of knowledge that studies human virtues (Aristotle’s works - “Nicomachean Ethics”, “Great Ethics” ", "Eudemic Ethics" - are the first, the subject area of ​​which is designated by the word "ethics").

The term "morality" - both in content and in the history of its origin - is a Latin analogue of the term "ethics". In Latin there is a word "mos" (plural - "mores"), corresponding to the ancient Greek ethos and denoting character, custom, fashion, stable order. On its basis, Cicero, in order to enrich the Latin language and with direct reference to the experience of Aristotle, formed the adjective “moral” (moralis) to denote ethics, calling it philosophia moralis. Later, presumably in the 4th century, the word “morality” (moralitas) appears as a collective characteristic of moral manifestations. The plural of it - moralia - was used as a designation for both moral philosophy and its subject.

In the Russian language there is a distinctive term “morality”, which is generally equivalent to the Greek word “ethics” and the Latin word “morality”. As far as one can tell, he is repeating their story. In the Russian dictionary of 1704 (Polikarpov’s dictionary) there is the word “right”, but there are still no words “moral” and “morality”. In the dictionary of 1780 (Nordstet's dictionary) there is already the word “moral”, but there is no word “morality”. And only in the dictionary of 1793 (academic dictionary), in addition to the two above mentioned, the word “morality” appears. It is interesting to note that the German term for morality (Sittlichkeit) also reproduces the history and logic of its foreign and more ancient equivalents. According to the explanatory dictionary of the Brothers Grimm, in the 13th century there was a word “character” (Sitte), and in the 14th century the word “moral” (sittlich) appeared, and only in the 16th century the noun “morality” (Sitllichkeit) appeared, summarizing a certain reality of the inner life of a person and his relationships with other people.

Thus, the terms “ethics”, “morality”, “morality” are approximately the same in their etymological content and history of origin. In the course of cultural development, they acquired various semantic shades, the most significant of which is the separation of ethics and morality (morality) as a science, a field of systematized knowledge, and its subject (or object). This attempt, although it has a long history, failed. Both language and spiritual experience resist assigning exclusively or even predominantly the significance of science to ethics, and depriving morality of any theoretical status.

In modern - both living and literary - Russian, all three terms meaningfully intersect and, in principle, are interchangeable. To say “ethical standards”, “moral standards”, “moral standards” means to say the same thing. Of course, a certain tradition of habitual word usage is emerging, but it is not rigid. For example, in relation to ideals, the term “moral” is often used - moral ideals. Nothing, however, prevents what are designated as “moral ideals” from being called “ethical ideals” or “moral ideals.” A certain area of ​​philosophical knowledge is usually called ethics or philosophical ethics, and it is often called moral philosophy, moral philosophy. We, as a rule, call abuses of moral preaching moralizing (moralizing); this same process can also be designated as moralizing, etizing.

Ethics in the strict sense of the word is neither a science nor even a field of theoretical knowledge, if by science, theoretical knowledge we understand the ideal doubling of reality, its more or less adequate subjective image. Knowledge in itself does not change the subject, but changes our view of it. At one time people thought that the Sun revolved around the Earth. Then they began to believe that the Earth revolves around the Sun. This fundamental change in our knowledge in itself had no effect on the real position of the Sun and Earth. Ethical knowledge is of a completely different kind. It changes the object itself, shapes it. As we have seen, both the term and concept of morality arise within the framework of systematized mental activity. Ethics may believe that morality is given by God. Or he may argue that it is due to historical circumstances. These two views, taken seriously, in their direct and binding meaning, give not just two different understandings, but also two different states of morality. Ethics would be more accurately defined not as the science of morality, but as self-conscious moral experience. And this is always a subjective experience, that is, the experience of the subject who reflects and is aware of himself.

Characterizing this feature of ethics, Aristotle said that its goal is not knowledge, but actions. A person does not study ethics in order to find out what virtue is, but in order to become virtuous. Or, to put it another way, morality, as the reality with which ethics deals, cannot exist without appeal to ethics. It needs ethics, it receives continuation and completion.

Features of morality

1. Among the mysteries that a person learns and overcomes in his experience, the most incomprehensible is himself. What is a person, where is he from and why? There are various, mutually exclusive answers to these questions - from the recognition that man is the creation of God, the crown of the universe, to the statement that he is an error of evolution, a painful mutation of nature. Without considering the concepts of man in essence, we note: their very mutually exclusive diversity is an expression of some distinctive features of human existence.

The life activity of all living beings, including those higher animals that are close to man in the evolutionary series and are considered related to him, is pre-programmed: it contains its own norm. Man is an exception; his life activity is not programmed. There is no predestination in his behavior. Individual variations in behavior, sometimes large, are also observed in animals. However, their type of behavior is predetermined. We know that if it develops normally, it will turn out to be a little lamb or a little wolf cub. But we can never say with certainty what will come of the little man. Anything can come out of it. And when they say about one that he looks like a lamb, another is called a predator, a third is compared to a snake, etc. - these are more than figurative expressions. A person lives according to the standards that he sets for himself. His actions are expedient, that is, he acts in accordance with the goals he sets for himself. The goal can be called a cause, which is not behind, but in front, given, as it were, not before the effect, but after it. A person himself will set the grounds, the reasons for his behavior.

Different people and the same person at different times can commit different, mutually exclusive actions. A raven will not peck out a crow's eye, says a Russian proverb. Animals have an innate prohibition against fratricide. They are characterized by instinctive inhibitory mechanisms that limit manifestations of aggressiveness against members of their own species. A person has none of this or is weakened to a very dangerous limit. We know from the Bible: Cain killed Abel. Brother kills brother. There are physiological mechanisms by which manifestations of life are a source of pleasant sensations, and manifestations of death (horror on the face, the sight of blood, etc.) generate instinctive disgust. A person can overcome these limitations to such an extent that he is able to enjoy suffering (phenomena of sadism or masochism). Man is a creature capable of anything - this judgment of the writer and sociologist A. A. Zinoviev is as much a harsh assessment as it is an impartial statement of fact.

Another aspect of the noted feature of human existence is that man is in the process of continuous development. He always strives to become different from what he really is, to rise above himself. He is constantly dissatisfied with himself, overwhelmed by the desire to be different, to go beyond his boundaries. This is most obvious and provocative in relation to death. Man is mortal, like everything natural. Nothing can cancel this fact; no one has ever been able to get around it. An individual's encounter with his own death is absolutely inevitable. Nevertheless, a person cannot accept this fact, rebels against it, challenges it. The desire for immortality is a specific human desire.

It is not enough to say: a person is not identical to himself. It should be added: he perceives this non-identity as a disadvantage. He is driven by the desire to be different, but he cannot accept this state of eternal becoming as the norm. At the same time, he wants to free himself from the desire to be different. It is common for a person to imagine life in the form of a hierarchy, the lowest point of which is the plant and animal world, and the top is a certain hypothetical, ideal state, called by some God, by others - communism, by others - the omega point, etc. Man himself in this hierarchy is in the middle . He is neither below nor above. He is on the stairs that lead from bottom to top. When describing the peculiarities of human existence in the philosophy of Neoplatonism, the image of a person who is waist-deep in water was used. Man’s existence is initially bifurcated: he strives to get out of the water, but remains in it; he is in the water, but strives to get out of it. Man occupies a middle position in space and, by definition, is an incomplete being. The desire for completion, which can also be called the desire for perfection, is a distinctive feature of man.

Morality is a person’s attitude towards himself in the perspective of his own striving for perfection, an ideal.

2. This isolation towards the ideal, perfection is expressed in the fact that in human motives and the actions corresponding to them there is a layer that cannot receive an empirically demonstrative explanation and does not fit within the boundaries of the law of causality and the principle of utility. Man, as already noted, does not want to accept death. This is the law of nature. However, we know of many cases where people go to death for their beliefs, considering them more important than life. We call this type of behavior heroic. Of two possible options for behavior in business, one of which promises an income of one million rubles, and the second ten times more, a person will choose the second. However, there are actions that he will not do for any money. There is no self-interest that would justify the betrayal of a friend, betrayal of the Motherland, because both friendship and love for the Motherland are valuable in themselves. They are selfless. Morality is that area of ​​the heroic and unselfish in man, which is not derived from circumstances and is not reduced to them, but has an autonomous, that is, self-legislative, character. It is gratuitous and unutilitarian.

The ancient Greek philosopher and physician Sextus Empiricus describes the following situation: a person who is under the surgeon’s knife endures the pain associated with it, but his loved ones, watching from the side, cannot bear it and faint. Why is this happening? There are different possible answers to this question. For Sextus Empiricus himself, this example illustrated the thesis of skeptical philosophy, according to which the main source of suffering is the imagination: the consciousness that suffering is bad brings more severe suffering than suffering itself. If we talk about the moral basis of the described situation, then it can be formulated as follows: compassion for the human person is more significant than suffering. Or, to put the same idea differently, the suffering of other people can have a stronger impact on a person than his own suffering.

3. Since the starting point of morality is a certain ideal state, which by definition is infinite, inexhaustibly perfect, then it cannot but be in a negative relation to any existing state, which is always finite and limited. Morality in its concrete expression therefore always has the character of prohibitions. A positive formulation in this case would mean the paradox of counted infinity.

This conclusion may raise objections, since there are many ethical proposals that contain positive content and take the form of prescriptions (be merciful, love your neighbor, etc.). They, however, are always so general and indefinite that they can be considered as variations of a single requirement - the requirement to be moral. Only moral prohibitions have a strict, specific and, most importantly, verifiable meaning. As Montepi said, the thinnest tip of a compass is too thick for a mathematical point. In the same way, actually practiced norms cannot be considered the embodiment of morality. Individuals and their actions differ from each other only in the degree of moral imperfection.

Since ancient times, a person has been divided into three components: body, soul, spirit. Morality is a characteristic of the soul. Not bodies. Not the spirit. And the souls. On the one hand, there are affects, natural instincts and aspirations - everything that is associated with pleasure and suffering. On the other hand, there is contemplative activity that takes a person into the pure realms of the absolute. The first is embodied in all the pragmatics of life. The second is in the highest forms of spiritual activity, art, philosophy, religion. The soul is the plane of intersection of affects and spirit, their transition into each other. These are not affects, but the ability of the latter to obey the instructions of the spirit as the highest authority. This is not the spirit, but its ability to be a controlling principle in relation to affects. Body and spirit form, as it were, two poles of the soul, its rational and unreasonable, higher and lower parts. If the body is the animal principle in man, and the spirit is the divine principle in him, then the soul represents the most human in man. The body binds a person to the earth, twists him with a hoop of insatiable desires, but with his spirit he contemplates the eternal. The soul is a combination of one thing with another, it characterizes a person in his movement from the lower to the higher, from the animal to God, from the finite to the infinite, it shows the measure of overcoming the animal-irrational principle and the measure of the embodiment of the divine-intelligent principle. The qualitative state of the soul is expressed in morality. Morality, in fact, is the anatomy of the soul. Just as the spirit can be true or false, the body can be strong or weak, so the soul can be good or evil, more precisely, virtuous or vicious (non-virtuous). It is not at all accidental that the figurative structure of culture connects the soul and morality with the same human organ - the heart.

What determines this or that state of the soul, and, accordingly, the moral qualities of a person? What constitutes the specific objectivity of the latter? Plato's dialogue "Phaedo" tells a myth according to which the souls of people after death are incarnated in animals according to the skills that they discovered in their human lives. Those who were prone to gluttony, debauchery and drunkenness will go into the breed of donkeys or similar animals. Those who preferred injustice, lust for power and predation will turn into wolves, hawks or kites. What will be the lot of virtuous people - reasonable and fair? They will most likely end up among bees, wasps, ants, or perhaps return to the human race, but in any case it will be a sociable and peaceful environment. In figurative form, Plato expressed a very important truth: the character of a person, the quality of his soul, are determined by the nature of his relationships with other people. These relationships themselves, and accordingly the human soul, become virtuous to the extent that they turn out to be meek, restrained, and moderate. It is interesting to note that, according to Plato, virtue is not enough to enter the race of gods. To do this, you still need to become a philosopher. Plato thereby denotes the difference between soul and morality, on the one hand, and reason and knowledge, on the other.

Morality is responsible for human coexistence; it is what binds, unites human coexistence, and makes it possible. In order for human community to take place, it is necessary to recognize it as a primary value. This is the content of morality.

People's relationships are concrete, "material." They are always built around something. Regarding the reproduction of life - and then we have the area of ​​sexual and family relations. Regarding health - and then we have a health care system. Regarding the maintenance of life - and then we have an economy. Regarding protection from crime - and then we have a judicial police system. Relations not only on the scale of society, but also between individuals are built according to the same principle: between a person and a person there is always something else, a third, thanks to which their relationship acquires dimension. People enter into relationships with each other insofar as they do something: write an article, have dinner in a restaurant, play chess, etc. Let us ask ourselves: what will remain in the relationship between them if this “something” is completely subtracted from them, everything concrete, objectively determined diversity?

Only their social form will remain, and this will be morality. Morality is the focus of people on each other, which exists initially, before any specific relationship between them and is a condition for the possibility of these relationships. There is no doubt that practical experience of cooperation determines morality. But without morality this experience of cooperation could not have taken place.

In order to understand the nature and purpose of the state, Hobbes postulated a certain hypothetical natural state of total enmity between people (war of all against all). In order to understand the nature and purpose of morality, we should make an assumption of the opposite kind - about the initial, state of unity of people, their harmony with themselves and with each other (isn’t this what the religious myth about the origin of humanity from one person - Adam and about the heavenly life of the first people?). The State cannot completely overcome the hostility of the people, and beneath the tempering crust of civilization there rage aggressive passions which from time to time, sometimes in very dangerous ways, tear it apart. In the same way, the objective, spatiotemporal disunity of people cannot completely break through their unity, the moral principle that unites all people.

In a word, morality is a social principle in man; it binds people together before all their other connections. It can be called the human (social) form of all connections and relationships between “them.” Morality outlines the universe within which only human existence as human can unfold.

6. Morality as a social form of relations between people, making possible all other objectively determined relations between them, as such a unifying principle that was given before the spatio-temporal separation of people and opposes it, is conceivable only in conjunction with freedom. Acts of freedom are by definition universal - nothing can oppose or limit them. Otherwise they would not be free. Moral universality, since it does not take into account any circumstances limiting it, presupposes freedom as its basis. Otherwise it would not be universal.

Morality is inherent only to a being with free will. Or, to put it another way, only it allows us to judge the presence of free will. As has been ironically observed in the history of philosophy, the best proof of the existence of free will is that without it man could not sin. It's witty, but not accurate. To explain vices, we do not need the postulate of free will, because vices have their own, completely sufficient empirical causes. The question of why a person sins, why he is prone to deception or stinginess, has never caused difficulties either in theory or in everyday practice. Another thing is the question of a person’s virtue, why he resists lies and strives to be generous: This cannot be answered without the assumption of free will. Moreover, the concept of virtue already contains such an assumption, since unselfishness, that is, not being bound by any benefits or temptations, is included in its definition.

The unity of freedom and universality (objectivity, necessity) is a characteristic feature of morality. Morality has nothing to do with arbitrariness. It has its own logic, no less strict and binding than the logic of natural processes. Morality exists in the form of law; it does not tolerate exceptions. The world of morality is generally valid, objective, necessary, but it is such a universal significance, objectivity, necessity, the path to which lies through the abyss called freedom. In the exact words of Kant, in morality a person is subject “only to his own and nevertheless universal legislation”1. The peculiarity of morality lies in the unity of two opposite poles of human activity: the voluntary-personal and the objective-universal.

7. How is the unity of personal autonomy and universal necessity possible? If morality, based on the free will of the individual, is a universal law, then, at least for all other people except this individual, it turns out to be predetermined, objectively prescribed. At the same time, this person himself finds himself in the zone of action of the moral law prescribed to him by other individuals. A paradox emerges: acts of free will cannot but be universal, but by becoming universal, they fetter free will. Since morality is a product of my freedom, it has the form of universality. But taking the form of a universal law, it externally limits the freedom of other individuals. This same idea can be expressed differently: since I cannot present anything other than my good will to justify morality, this precisely means that I have no reason to consider it a law for others and, in any case, no reason to demand from them, so that they unconditionally recognize the moral law formulated by me, that is, mine. Or this is my law, and then it cannot be universal. Or this is a universal law, and then it cannot be mine.

If we exclude pseudo-solutions, which would consist in abandoning either the idea of ​​the universality of morality (these are types of empirical ethics that connect morality with some material principle - interest, benefit, etc.), or the idea of ​​personal autonomy (this path was taken theological ethics, which interprets moral requirements as the commandments of God), then the way out of this dilemma consists in concretizing the concepts of personal autonomy and universal law in relation to morality. A person is autonomous in the sense that she herself chooses the law of her existence, she, and only she, makes a choice between natural necessity and moral law. Morality is a universal law in the sense that nothing limits it; This is not a real universality, but an ideal one. The individual will turns out to be free not when it presents its own as the universal, but when it chooses the universal as its own. Free will is identical to moral will. The will becomes free when it turns out to be moral. An unconditional moral law, based on the autonomy of the individual, has different meanings for the individual himself and for other people. For the individual himself, he exists really, for other people - ideally. A moral person appeals to the universal law not in order to present it to others, but in order to choose it as the law of his own life. Without this, she cannot reliably know whether her will is truly free and moral.

The relationship between universality and individuality, which is specific to morality, can be clearly seen in the example of the golden rule of morality - one of the most ancient and generally accepted formulas of the moral law. The Golden Rule appears in different cultures at approximately the same time - in the middle of the first millennium BC. Everywhere it has a similar formulation, the most complete and detailed of which we find in the Gospel of Matthew (Matthew 7:12): “In everything that you want people to do to you, do so to them.” In the Russian language it became a proverb: “What you don’t love in another, don’t do it yourself.” This rule in its universal and mandatory part, which also applies to other people, has an ideal character, appears in the form of a certain internal image: how you want people to treat you; what you don’t like in someone else... The same rule, when applied to the individual himself, already has the form of an effective prescription: do the same... don’t do it yourself. In the first case we are talking about volition, an ideal project, in the second - about actions.

Before and in order to accept a certain rule as the norm of one’s own behavior, a person needs to mentally test it for universality, universality. The golden rule of morality, in fact, offers the conditions for such an experiment: a person must imagine whether he himself would want to obey these norms if they were practiced by other people in relation to him. To do this, you must not only put yourself in the place of another, but also put him in your place - change places with him.

8. Freedom is not only the basis of morality, it is at the same time its space. The mysterious field of personal autonomy, through which a breakthrough into the sphere of moral necessity is made, is at the same time its only testing ground.

The binding force of morality is mediated by free choice. This means: the moral law, unlike all other normative requirements, does not allow for individual differences between subject and object. A person follows only those moral standards that he internally approves and considers best. And he accepts as the best only those moral standards that he would like to see as the norms of his own life. A person's attitude towards morality is of a very special kind: he does not know morality, he lives it. Proclaiming morality and practicing it are two moments of the same process. They cannot be divorced without their morals being seriously deformed. The inhuman burden of morality can be justified only by the fact that a person voluntarily takes it upon himself. Morality is a game in which a person puts himself at stake. Socrates was forced to drink poison. Jesus Christ was crucified. Giordano Bruno was burned. Gandhi was assassinated. These are the stakes in this game.

Since morality precedes objectively determined relationships between people, it cannot have adequate objective embodiment. If, as the philosopher Wittgenstein said, we imagined an absolute personality possessing omniscience, then in this universe of knowledge there would be no place for ethical judgments. Morality does not speak about what was, is or will be. She talks about what should be. Moral statements cannot be tested for either truthfulness or practical effectiveness. Morality does not fit into words or actions. It is measured only by the efforts aimed at its implementation. This is why morality is self-binding.

Paradoxes of morality

So, the concept of morality can be reduced to the following basic definitions: a) morality is the desire for perfection; b) it is not subject to the law of causality and the principle of utility; c) specific expressions of morality act as prohibitions; d) morality is the perfect state of the human soul; e) it characterizes a person’s ability to live together and represents a social form of relations between people; f) morality is the unity of personal autonomy and universal law; g) the most adequate form of moral law is the golden rule of morality; h) the moral law does not allow the separation of the subject and object of action.

One of the most difficult theoretical and practical problems of ethics is the problem of personification of morality. In the history of thought and culture, the dominant view was that some individuals are good and moral, while others are evil and immoral, and therefore the former must teach the latter. This is one of the most common and insidious deformations of morality. Let us consider two typical cases of such deformation, called paradoxes of moral behavior and moral assessment.

The classic formulation of the paradox of moral behavior is usually considered to be the words of Ovid: “I see good, I praise, but I am attracted to evil”1. It is human nature to strive for the best for oneself - good, kind. In this situation, however (and this is its paradox), the opposite happens: he chooses the worst, the bad, as if harming himself. It turns out: a person knows morality, but does not follow it. It has no binding meaning for him. In this case, can we assume that he really knows morality (sees and approves the best). No, it is impossible, because we have no other criterion of morality other than efforts to implement it. In the situation described, a person only believes, only pretends that he sees and approves the best, the good. In fact, you cannot know morality without being moral. An indicator of a person’s attitude to morality is his actions, his willingness to experience its beneficial power. You will recognize them by their fruits - this gospel rule can be considered a solution to this paradox.

Without such an existential (action-focused) reading of morality, we would not have a criterion for determining the measure of virtue of specific individuals. The fact is that a person does not just think of himself as better than he actually is. He generally tends to think well of himself. The subjective reference point for his own actions is always good. Even people who are considered to be notorious villains strive to pass off their crimes as just deeds. At the same time, they can be very sincere. Moral self-delusion is not always deception and hypocrisy. Most often it is self-deception. Let us remember how Raskolnikov, the main character of F. M. Dostoevsky’s novel “Crime and Punishment,” before committing a crime, makes enormous intellectual efforts to justify it: he kills an old woman who is useless to anyone, even harmful to everyone. And he does this so that he gets the opportunity to do many good deeds... He looks for all these “arguments” not for others, but first of all for himself. Raskolnikov wants to deceive himself and portray his (planned) evil as good in his own eyes. If we go by what people approve of and in what ethical light they want to appear to others, then we would have to relegate them all to the category of angels. There is no need to suffer from excessive suspicion in order not to believe a person’s moral self-attestation. Common human life, the social atmosphere would be much cleaner if individuals did not think and, in any case, did not each say about themselves that they are good (honest, conscientious, etc.) people.

The paradox of moral judgment concerns the question of who can exercise moral judgment. It is logical to assume that such a function could be taken on by people who rise above others according to moral criteria, just as this happens in all other areas of knowledge and practice (a biologist has the right of authoritative judgment on biology, on legal issues - a lawyer, etc. .). However, one of the undoubted qualities of a moral person is modesty, and even moreover, the awareness of one’s depravity. He cannot consider himself worthy of judging anyone. On the other hand, people who willingly take on the role of judge and teacher in moral matters, by this very fact already reveal a level of complacency that is organically alien to morality and is an unmistakable indicator of ethical deafness. Those who could exercise moral judgment will not do so; those who would administer moral judgment cannot be trusted to do so. Moral judgment in this context is understood broadly - as moral teaching.

The way out of this hopeless situation lies in the moral requirement: “Do not judge others.” Moral court is a person's court over himself, and in this it differs from legal court. An act for which a person is responsible to other people is called a crime; the same act, when a person is responsible for it to his conscience, is called evil (or sin). A crime is a crime of any rule, which is clearly stated in custom, law or other objectified form. Sin is a violation of the moral law, to which a person is internally attached (this is what is meant when it is said that the moral law is imprinted on the human heart). “The law is the conscience of the state,” wrote T. Hobbes. Reinterpreting it, we can say: “Conscience (the voice of morality) is the law of the individual.”

The requirement for the unity of subject and object as a condition for the normal functioning of morality is especially tough and indisputable in cases of moral condemnation. As for moral praise, the question of its justification and specific forms requires special consideration. Nevertheless, in general, it also has a paradoxical nature: self-praise of an individual is under a moral prohibition, and praise of others can be interpreted as a hidden form of self-praise. After all, one must have the right not only to condemn others, but also to praise them.

Phenomenology of envy in ancient Greece

Soberly observing modern morals, one cannot help but notice how much envy oozes them: It seems that people suffer more not because they live poorly and receive little, but because their neighbors live better and receive more. Inequality is taken by many at the lower end as a personal affront, and they would be happy to bring everyone down to their level. Why is this happening? Is envy an anthropological property of humans? To what extent is it related to social life? Can it be directed in a positive direction? To understand the depth and complexity of such a phenomenon of evil as envy, turning to its history, in particular to the philosophical understanding of its origins in Ancient Greece, will help.

Moral evil, according to Hegel (and earlier according to B. Mandeville), is historically changeable and is an essential element of the progress of society. Interpreting this idea that shocks us, F. Engels called the bad passions of man “the levers of historical development...” [*]. In fact, in all centuries, such categories of human culture as greed, selfishness, hypocrisy, vanity, malice, and many others like them have played a significant role in the composition of the motives driving human behavior. However, it is precisely moral evil and individual passions of the human character that have been very poorly studied, especially in their historical retrospect, although without them “there has never been and cannot be anything great” [**].

[*] Marx K., Engels F. Soch. T. 21. P. 296.

[**] Hegel. Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences. M., 1977. T. 3. P. 320.

Among such passions - structural elements of moral evil - is envy. Its poor study is, apparently, primarily due to the fact that the study of envy does not fit into the narrowly formulated framework of the subject of ethics, social psychology or sociology. And yet, certain steps towards revealing the phenomenon of envy were taken by F. Bacon, I. Kant, A. Smith, A. Schopenhauer, S. Kierkegaard, N. Hartmann, M. Scheler, A. Koestler and especially F. Nietzsche and 3 Freud. The artistic image of envy was created in the 20s of our century in the short stories of the same name by E. Reg and Y. Olesha. Recently, envy has begun to appear more and more often on the pages of works on sociology.

How can we explain the increasing interest of scientists in the phenomenon of envy? The answer to this question, apparently, should be sought first of all in the very moral and psychological situation of our time. The 20th century, more than ever before, helps to strengthen this feeling among people. Orientation towards consumerism cannot but be accompanied by envy, which, with ever-growing force, sucks a person into the “consumption race”. On the other hand, the gradual erasing of social-class differences between people, at least in their external manifestation, stimulates the spirit of competition and a sense of rivalry, which inevitably leads to a clash of ambitious individuals, activates envy of people with a “happy fate”, those with great wealth and "those in power." Envy turns out to be a constant companion of any egalitarianism. This is confirmed by an interesting experiment. In the 60s, American colleges and universities began to invite leading and most talented specialists in various specialties to work. They tried to attract them with double the salaries of regular professors. However, most of them refused the flattering offer, openly admitting that they could not get rid of the feeling of fear of becoming an object of envy in the faculty.

The search for “pure” material in the phenomenological study of envy prompted us to turn to ancient Greek culture. In this regard, the English philologist P. Walcott noted: “Envy is always contained within ourselves, but only the Greeks were honest enough to recognize this fact of reality and, when discussing the motives of human behavior, talk about it quite openly” [*]. Subsequently, people became less open about their shortcomings. In modern times, the situation around envy is changing dramatically. On this occasion, already in the 17th century, François de La Rochefoucauld wrote the following: “People often boast of the most criminal passions, but no one dares to admit to envy, a timid and bashful passion” [**].

[*] Walcot P. Envy and the Greeks. A Study of Human Behavior. Warminster, 1978. P. 7.

[**] La Rochefoucauld F. de. Maxims and moral reflections. M.; L., 1959. P. 8.

Different peoples are distinguished by their unique ideas of justice, love, and hope, but it is amazing how everyone, including even the most primitive cultures, shows amazing unanimity in the definition of envy. Its destructive nature is emphasized everywhere, and the feeling of envy is condemned. But envy nevertheless continues to occupy a significant place in a person’s public and private life. In this sense, the ancient Greek paradigm of envy, with a certain degree of convention, can be universalized. Despite the significant difference in the internal freedom of the moral subject of modern society and the rigid framework of traditions and customs of the Greeks, envy, as one of the manifestations of moral evil in its evolution, reveals much greater conservatism than such moral feelings as conscience and shame.

This is manifested primarily in terminological similarity. To designate this phenomenon, the Greeks mainly used two synonyms - phthonos and dzelos, which obviously correlate with our “envy” and “jealousy”. Depending on the context, these two terms could not only replace or complement each other, but also be used as opposites. A completely different shade is put, for example, into the phrases: “envious eye”, “envious eye” or “jealous glance”; “envyable” and “jealous attitude”; “black” and “white” envy; “blind jealousy”, etc. Likewise, in the Greek language there were a countless number of phrases and derivatives from “envy” and “jealousy,” including even personal names, like the name of the famous tyrant of Syracuse Polyzelus (literally: “surrounded by universal envy”).

Before turning to the consideration of the ancient Greek paradigm of envy, let us outline in the most general terms the content, nature, subject and object, mechanisms and conditions for the formation of envy in general and try to look at them through the prism of ancient ideas.

The "Golden Rule" of Envy

In V. Dahl's dictionary, envy is interpreted as “annoyance at someone else's good and blessings” and as “unwillingness for the good of another, but only for oneself.” The tendency to explain envy through sadness, mental distress, grief, and annoyance goes back to classical antiquity. For comparison, we present the two most famous definitions of envy in antiquity.

Envy is grief over the benefits that friends have in the present or that they had in the past.

(Plato) [*]

[*] Plato. Dialogues. M., 1986. P. 435.

Envy is a kind of sadness that appears at the sight of the prosperity of people like us, enjoying the above-mentioned benefits - [sadness] that does not have the goal of delivering anything to the envious [person], but has in mind only these other people.

(Aristotle) ​​[*]

[*] Aristotle. Rhetoric//Ancient rhetoric. M., 1978. P. 93.

This approach synthesizes a moral and psychological assessment of the phenomenon of envy: it acts as an abstract concept, conventionally used in literature and in communication. There is no specific analogue in nature and human social life: there are only people who experience feelings of envy. It is akin to feelings of fear, anxiety, anger, malice and the like. In this sense, envy is one of the fundamental psychological processes and at the same time one of the fundamental experiences. Using Hegelian terminology, we can say that envy is a practical feeling. But since this feeling always presupposes the interaction of at least two individuals, and, as historical experience shows, their number can grow endlessly, then in fact it turns out to be socially charged. However, envy never becomes a universal social phenomenon, an all-encompassing cause; a person cannot only be “envious”, he is also homo faber (“working man”), homo ludens (“playing man”), etc. But still, sometimes envy becomes for an individual and even an entire social group something like a value orientation, acquiring the character of a social attitude or manifesting itself in a special type of social behavior. Thus, from a psychological point of view, envy can be understood both as an emotion (situational envy), and as a feeling (sustained envy), and, finally, as a passion (all-encompassing envy).

According to the mechanism of formation and functioning, jealousy is not much different from envy. It also begins with doubt (for example, about someone's loyalty) and, turning into painful mistrust, becomes blind and passionate. Envy and jealousy are the opposite of their objects: the first is always annoyance and grief at someone else's success or well-being; the second strives to preserve what the subject already has. It is no coincidence that modern synonymous dictionaries contrast envy and jealousy in the direction of passion, respectively, “toward oneself” and “from oneself.” In La Rochefoucauld this difference is expressed very clearly: “Jealousy is to some extent reasonable and fair, for it wants to preserve our property or what we consider to be such, while envy is blindly indignant at the fact that ours also have some property.” neighbors" [*].

[*] La Rochefoucauld F. de. Maxims and moral reflections. S. 8.

What is the main thesis of envy and the main condition for its formation? In his essay on the phenomenon of envy, Aristotle draws a distinction between those who are envied and those who are not. Envy among equals is Aristotle's defining sociological idea. This idea was first heard in Homer's Odyssey. Narrating the arrival of Odysseus to Ithaca in the guise of a poor wanderer, Homer confronts him with a well-known poor man on the island, who perceived the hero’s arrival as an attack on his vital and “monopoly” right to live on alms.

Looking gloomily from under his brows, the noble Odysseus said:
“You are crazy, I do no harm to anyone here; and how much
Whoever gives it to you, I will not envy you; both
We can sit spaciously on this threshold; no need
It’s up to us to start an argument...” [*]

[*] Homer Odyssey. M., 1982. P. 223.

This idea was further developed by Hesiod and Herodotus. So, in one of the passages from Herodotus’s “History” it is told how, by voting, they tried to decide which of the Hellenes during the Greco-Persian War accomplished the most outstanding feat.

“Arriving on Isthmus, the military leaders received votive stones at the altar of Poseidon in order to elect the one who would receive the first and second awards. Then each of them put the stones for himself, considering himself the most worthy. The majority awarded the second award to Themistocles. So, each military leader received one vote, but Themistocles far surpassed everyone in the number of votes cast for the second award. Out of envy, the Hellenes did not want to award [Themistocles the first award] and, without making any decision, each returned to their own homes” [*].

[*] Herodotus. Story. L., 1972. S. 409 - 410.

In Xenophon's Memoirs of Socrates, envy is defined as grief caused not by the failures of loved ones or the success of an enemy, but, paradoxically, precisely by the successes of friends. Summarizing these observations of Greek thinkers on the formation of envy among equals, Aristotle writes:

“Envy will be experienced by those people for whom there are similar or seemingly similar. Similar - I mean, by origin, by kinship, by age, by talent, by fame, by condition.”

And vice versa:

“...as for those who lived tens of thousands of years before us, or who will live tens of thousands of years after us, or who have already died, no one [envies] them, just like those who live at the Pillars of Hercules. (We do not envy] those who, in our opinion or in the opinion of others, are not much superior to us or much inferior to us" [*].

[*] Aristotle Rhetoric//Ancient Rhetoric S 93, 94.

However, ancient authors already quite clearly realized that most often envy remains at the level of “unwilling good for another.” In those rare cases when envy inspires activity, the subject’s activity is mainly reduced to various kinds of destructive acts, such as spreading rumors, slander, slander, etc. This pattern is, perhaps, the fundamental difference between the feeling of envy and the spirit of competition. From their contrast, the “golden rule” of envy emerges: “do not wish for another what you wish for yourself.” As the antithesis of the “golden rule” of morality, envy is to a certain extent opposed to goodness, despite its essentially passive nature, since the choice is concentrated between “desire” and “unwilling.” The essence of the “golden rule” of envy was well conveyed by Aristotle:

“... a person, under the influence of a sense of competition, tries to achieve benefits himself, and... under the influence of envy, he strives to prevent his neighbor from enjoying these benefits” [*].

[*] Ibid. P. 95.

Along with this understanding of the nature of envy, the Greeks, with their inherent irrationality of worldview, were not alien to the deification of envy. Phtonos, the demon personifying envy, appeared to them in male form. The oldest version of this is found in the Homeric poems, where envy appears in the rank of deity. Gradually, this idea begins to change under the influence of developing philosophy: envy as a manifestation of supernatural power becomes incompatible with the “new” understanding of the “divine.” From now on, Phtonos acquires the quality of a demon, approaching in its status the underground gods, like Tikha and Moira. In ancient literature one can find many descriptions of the fact that any human prosperity and success aroused the jealousy of Phtonos, after which, as a rule, “trouble” followed, most often ending in death. The Greek poet Callimachus placed Phthonos in the ears of Apollo in order to turn him against the poets. Ovid in Metamorphoses shows how Phtonos (in Roman mythology Jnvidia is endowed with a feminine nature) arouses the jealousy of the gods towards each other.

And yet, in the written tradition, much more often we encounter not sacralized, but secular envy. For Greek speakers of the classical era, such as Demosthenes, Isocrates, Aeschines, Lysias, addressing the topic of envy is a favorite rhetorical device. From their speeches we can conclude that not only such outstanding personalities as Philip of Macedon, but also ordinary citizens were subject to this harmful passion.

An interesting speech by Lysias, “On the fact that they do not give a pension to a disabled person,” has been preserved, in the introduction to which the speaker depicts an atmosphere of envy in Athens during the era of the crisis of the polis (IV century BC). It is known that there was a law according to which the state paid a pension in the amount of one obol per day to disabled people. Every year, something like re-certification of disability was carried out, during which any citizen could protest against the issuance of a pension to a person who was “sufficiently” healthy and had such an income that he could provide for himself without state benefits. During the trial, at one of the meetings of the Council of Five Hundred, the accused cripple delivered a speech composed for him by Lysias. The speaker begins the introductory part to the speech with the thesis that the disabled person with his life “rather deserved praise than envy,” and his opponent brought the case “only out of envy.” And, substantiating this thesis, he states: “... it is immediately clear that he envies me, namely, that I, despite my shortcomings, am more an honest citizen than he is.”

Having made these necessarily brief general remarks, we can now move on to a detailed consideration of the main concepts of ancient envy, focusing on the most significant theories and their criticism. The main pathos of the proposed essay is formulated by folk wisdom: “envy was born before us” and repeated by Herodotus: “envy has been inherent in people since ancient times.”

"And the potter is jealous of the potter"

The famous master Daedalus, the legendary builder of the labyrinth on Crete, the inventor of the art of sculpting, carpentry and countless tools and all kinds of devices, according to ancient myth, committed a serious crime and was expelled from his hometown. Apollodorus, Athenian grammarian of the 2nd century BC. e., the author of the famous mythological “Library”, brought to us an interesting detail of the myth of Daedalus.

Daedalus took as his student Talos, the son of Perdika's sister, who turned out to be an amazingly capable and inventive young man. One day, having found the jaw of a snake, he sawed a tree very thin with it. And this angered the teacher. Fearing that his student would surpass him in art, Daedalus became jealous of him and threw him off the top of the acropolis. Convicted of murder, Daedalus was tried in the Areopagus and, found guilty, fled from Athens [*].

[*] See: Apollodorus. Mythological library. L., 1972. P. 75.

This plot was later presented in poetic form by Ovid in Metamorphoses:

Not knowing his fate, his sister entrusted him with the sciences
Teach my son - he just turned twelve
The boy was old and mentally capable of learning.
Once, having examined the signs of the fish’s spinal ridge,
He took it as a sample and cut it on a sharp iron
A row of continuous teeth: opened the saw application.
He first tied two iron legs with a single knot,
So that when they are at an equal distance from each other,
One stood firmly, while the other circled around.
Daedalus became jealous; from the sacred stronghold of Minerva
He threw his pet headlong and lied that he fell [*].

[*] Ovid. Metamorphoses. M., 1977. P. 201.

The myth described is perhaps the oldest example of professional envy known to us. What contributed to its development in Ancient Greece?

The cardinal feature that distinguishes Greek society from its peers lies in the polis’ orientation towards competition, which covered almost all spheres of human activity: economic competition, competition in valor and virtue, sports games, musical agon, etc. The competitive spirit so permeated life in Ancient Greece, that the 19th century Swiss cultural historian J. Burckhardt considered it possible to characterize the Greek as an “atonal man.”

However, Greek competitiveness should not be represented in the form of a competitive spirit characteristic of bourgeois society. The Greek's orientation toward competition was not subordinated to rational, much less utilitarian, considerations. Rather, it acted as a form of manifestation of one’s self. Aristotle expressed some thoughts on this matter in “Rhetoric”:

“The feeling of competition is a certain grief at the sight of the apparent presence in people similar to us by nature of goods that are associated with honor and which we could have acquired ourselves, arising not because another has these goods, but because they do not ourselves. That’s why competition [as a zealous desire to be equal] is something good and happens to good people, but envy is something low and happens to low people” [*].

[*] Aristotle. Rhetoric//Ancient rhetoric. pp. 94 - 95.

Aristotle here gives, firstly, a definition of the incentive to compete as goods “that are associated with honor”, ​​and, secondly, connects feelings of competition with feelings of envy. It turns out that envy, being a by-product of any competition, can also act in its positive meaning - as a stimulating factor in activity and social activity. Hesiod was the first to distinguish these two aspects of envy in Greek thought. As the first European moralist, he gave the problem an ethical coloring, highlighting good envy and vicious envy.

Hesiod's poem "Works and Days" is largely autobiographical. The plot unfolds around the main event in the poet's life - a feud with his brother Pers. After the death of their father, the brothers divided the inheritance among themselves, but the Persian expressed dissatisfaction with the division and started a lawsuit against his brother. The judges bribed by Persian ruled in his favor, but, being a lazy, dissolute and envious person, Persian quickly incurred debts, fell into poverty and was forced to eke out a miserable existence with his family. Having immortalized the dishonor of his brother and the corruption of the judges in the poem, Hesiod painted a picture of a morally virtuous life.

“Works and Days” is certainly a didactic poem. It contains moral precepts for the correct life of a practical and intelligent farmer, as well as a sum of theological knowledge. The ancients claimed that Alexander the Great expressed the difference between the heroic epic of Homer and the didactic epic of Hesiod in the following words: “Hesiod is a poet for men, Homer is for kings.”

Drawing a sad picture of the moral decay of his contemporary society, Hesiod writes that “father with son and son with father, friend with guest and comrade with comrade” do not live in harmony; they honor people who “do evil or violence”, “spoil bad husband, speaking deceitful words and taking a false oath.” At the same time, the poet did not fail to add that “envy, among all people worthy of pity, screams loudly, walks with eyes full of hatred, rejoicing in evil.” “There will be no deliverance from evil,” the poet concludes.

This pessimistic picture of moral decline is necessary for Hesiod in order to “show the advantage of a morally legitimate course of action” [*]. Proposing his moral ideal, Hesiod focuses readers' attention on the virtue of labor and justice, which he understands as legality. Appealing to human shame and conscience, he argues that “there is no shame in work, there is shame in idleness.”

[*] Guseinov A. A. Introduction to ethics. M., 1985. P. 42.

Ethical reflection and the affirmation of the moral imperative allowed Hesiod to rise above the one-sided mythological understanding of envy. It is no coincidence that he believes the existence of two Eris. One - the personification of strife - accompanies Ares as his sister and girlfriend in the battle scenes of the Iliad. The poem “Theogony,” where Hesiod sets out the Greek ideas about the genealogy of the gods and the creation of the universe, also speaks of one Eris, the daughter of Night. But from the very beginning of the poem “Works and Days,” Hesiod introduces another Eris - competitive jealousy (or envy), which already has a beneficial effect on people. The lines from this poem, containing Hesiod’s appeal [*] to his brother Persus, help to understand the difference between good and vicious envy:

[*] Quote. by: Hesiod. Works and days. M, 1927 pp. 11-26 (translated by V. Veresaev).

Know that there are two different Eris in the world,
And not just one. A reasonable person would approve
To the first one. The other is worthy of reproach. And different in spirit"
This one is a fierce war and causes evil enmity,
Terrible People don't like her. Only by the will of the immortals
They honor this heavy Eris against their will.
The first, earlier than the second, was born of the many-gloomy Night;
The Almighty pilot placed it between the roots of the earth,
Zeus, living in the ether, made it more useful;
This can force even the lazy to work;
A sloth sees that another next to him is getting rich.
He will also be in a hurry with the attachments, with the sowing, with the device
At home. Neighbor competes with neighbor [*], who is for wealth
The heart strives. This Eris is useful for mortals.
Envy feeds the potter towards the potter and the carpenter towards the carpenter,
A beggar is a beggar, but a singer competes diligently with a singer.

[*] This phrase can be taken literally: “a neighbor is jealous of a neighbor” (dzeloi de te geitona geiton).

The idea proposed by Hesiod about the connection between envy and competition was developed by Aristotle three and a half centuries later, noting that since “people compete with their opponents in battle. rivals in love and in general with those who covet the same thing [that they do], then it is necessary that they envy these persons most of all, which is why it is said “and the potter [envyes] the potter” [*]. In the fight against “gloating and malicious envy,” Hesiod appeals to Aidos and Nemesis - personified shame and conscience. Later, on this basis, the Greeks would develop a new fundamental theory.

[*] Aristotle Rhetoric//Ancient Rhetoric P. 94.

"Envy of the Gods"

“There has long been a rumor among mortals that happiness is fraught with misfortune and it is not given to him to die until misfortune is born” - this is how Aeschylus formulates the idea of ​​​​divine envy (Agamemnon, 749 - 752) [*].

[*] Aeschylus. Tragedies. M., 1978. P. 209.

In the form of a pre-moral concept (defensive magic), people's belief in the “envy” of a supernatural principle for all human happiness and success is perhaps inherent in all primitive cultures. In the form of numerous relics, it has survived to this day (magical actions so as not to “jinx it”). In the developed civilizations of the East, these ideas take on a moral form, which is echoed in the famous parable of Solomon: “Two things I ask of You, do not refuse me, before I die: remove vanity and lies from me, do not give me poverty and wealth, feed me with my daily bread, so that, having had my fill, I will not deny You and say: “Who is the Lord?” and lest, having become poor, I should not steal and take the name of my God in vain” (30:7-9). But only in Greek thought the idea of ​​“the envy of the gods” takes on the form of a coherent ethical-theological system, especially among the tragedians, Pindar and Herodotus. But I would still like to start with the epic.

It is noteworthy that two poems attributed to the same author - the Iliad and the Odyssey - contain essentially different approaches to this problem. In the Iliad, the entire theogonic system was carefully developed for the first time, but in the poem there is not even a hint of the existence of God's envy of mortals. The presence of gods in all human affairs, their omnipotence, divine concern for the preservation of harmony, anthropomorphism, expressed, among other things, in the fact that the gods were endowed with the whole gamut of human emotions - all this served as the core of the mythological consciousness of fear of God and fear of divine wrath, inspired rather violation of the principle “to God is God’s” than by envy. It is no coincidence that Diomedes, addressing Hector, almost literally repeats the same phrase twice: “No, I do not want to fight with the blessed gods!” [*]

[*] Homer. Iliad. 6, 141.

The situation begins to gradually change in the Odyssey. The behavior of the heroes of this poem is already determined to a greater extent by free choice, although it can be no less predetermined by the gods. The moral individuals of the Odyssey are therefore more sensitive to “unjust” and “good”, although are still incapable of ethical reflection. But at the same time, they are extremely susceptible to all kinds of prejudices. And when comparing the two epics, one can see how the idea of ​​“the envy of the gods” gradually begins to crystallize.

Menelaus, anticipating a possible meeting with Odysseus and describing it in all its beauty, notes that “the adamant god did not want to give us such a great good, forbidding him, the unfortunate man, the desired return” (Odyssey, 4, 181 - 182). Twice Alcinous, the king of the Phaeacians, complains that “the god Poseidon is dissatisfied with us because we transport everyone across the seas safely” (Odyssey, 8, 565 - 566; 13, 173 - 174). Finally, at the conclusion of the poem, Homer puts this same thought into Penelope’s mouth at the moment when Odysseus destroys all her doubts by revealing a secret known only to the two of them. Addressing her husband, Penelope says:

Among people, you have always been the most reasonable and kind. The gods condemned us to sorrow; It was not pleasing to the gods that, having tasted our sweet youth together, we should calmly reach the threshold of a cheerful Old Age.

(Odyssey, 23, 209 - 213)

It is not difficult to notice that in the above fragments from the poem of wanderings, the idea of ​​​​the jealousy of the gods for human luck, prosperity, wealth, and all human happiness slips through. The culminating moment of the development of thought is the words of Calypso: “Jealous gods, how mercilessly adamant you are towards us!” (dzelemones exochon aeeon - Odyssey, 5, 118). And yet, from these fragments it does not follow that the epic heroes experience a feeling of trembling fear of the “envy of the gods” [*], but rather are indignant at this state of affairs. Fear becomes a fundamental feature of the moral and religious culture of Greece only in the archaic and classical periods. The reasons for such a radical transition apparently lie, on the one hand, in the change in the “heroic” model of culture, on the other, in the isolation of moral norms and the formation of a new type of moral culture.

[*] It is noteworthy that in the Odyssey the poet does not use the verb phthoneo (“to envy”), which was stereotyped by later authors, but agamai in the meaning of “to be indignant”, “to envy”.

In cultural studies, it is customary to distinguish between two types of sociocultural regulation of individual behavior: “culture of shame” and “culture of guilt” [*]. The system-forming core of culture of the first type is public approval or censure of the individual, and not the individual’s self-esteem, therefore any deviation from the prevailing norms of behavior causes disapproval on the part of the collective and inspires a feeling of shame and disgrace in the subject. This type of culture dominates at the epic stage of development of many ethnic groups. Homer's poems quite clearly illustrate the type of “culture of shame.” That is why “the uniqueness of the moral situation reproduced by Homer is that there are moral individuals, but there are no formulated generally binding moral norms,” that is, in the moral society of Homer’s society there is no “abstractly fixed criterion for distinguishing between the moral and the immoral” [**]. This, apparently, explains the fact that Homeric heroes experience both fear of public evaluation and awe of the gods.

[*] The impetus for sociological generalizations in this vein was the book Benedict R. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture. N. Y., 1946.

[**] Guseinov A. A. Introduction to ethics. pp. 40, 42.

The “culture of guilt” is characterized by a reorientation of the personality type towards introversion - towards self-esteem and self-regulation. In other words, there is a transition to ethical reflection and moral responsibility of the individual. On this basis, in Greece in the 7th - 6th centuries BC. e. moral norms of obligation are isolated from the actual behavior of the individual. And this is the essence of the moral revolution in Greece. The essence of the cultural revolution is the development of a competitive spirit, the emergence of which creates the necessary socio-psychological environment for the emergence of feelings of envy in the broad sense of the word. Under the influence of the totality of these factors, the concept of “envy of the gods” was finally formulated in Greece.

Judging by the texts of Greek authors of the 6th - 4th centuries BC. e., they did not set themselves the goal of revealing the essence of the concept of “envy of the gods” (phthonos theon). When addressing their audiences, poets, tragedians, and the “fathers of history” did not focus on the “envy” of any particular god. Envy has always been attributed to some anonymous, abstract divine force. The appeal to an unnamed deity or demon, apparently, is typologically inherent in mytho-epic thinking. It was apparently clear to contemporaries what “punishing” functions of the gods were being discussed, since the idea itself came from popular beliefs and prejudices. And it is no coincidence that references to divine envy have always been fleeting and subordinate to other, more significant goals of the authors. This is why the idea of ​​the “envy of the gods” itself has evolved little; It can be seen much more clearly what color Greek thinkers gave to this factor in the life of an individual as ethical thought developed. In this regard, three pairs of authors can be distinguished in a chronological and conceptual sense: Pindar - Bacchylides, Aeschylus - Herodotus, Euripides - Thucydides.

Lyricists who continued to think in terms of polis morality resorted to the concept of “envy of the gods,” as a rule, in those cases when they sought to especially emphasize the “virtuous” behavioral ideal of a reasonable, moderate and “envyable” citizen in a good sense. Pindar, like Bacchylides, was undoubtedly an apologist for competition. For him, a person’s desire to “be noticeable”, the ascension to feat and success are the essence of a person’s natural desires. His odes, which glorified the winners of four pan-Greek competitions - Olympic, Pythian, Nemean, Isthmian, are filled with the same spirit. Greek competitive games, as M. L. Gasparov rightly notes, are inadequately understood by people of our day [*]. They identified not so much who was the best in this or that sporting art, but rather the best person in general, blessed with divine grace. And since the competition acted as a test for the possession of God's grace, it could at the same time become a test for divine envy. As if driving her away, Pindar exclaims:

[*] See: Gasparov M. L. Poetry of Pindar // Pindar. Bacchylides. Odes. Fragments. M., 1980. P. 362.

Undeprived shareholders of Hellenic delights, May they not meet the turn of God's envy: God be kind to them!

(Pythian songs) [*]

[*] Pindar. Bacchylides, Odes. Fragments. P. 109.

And in order for the fate of the Olympic winner to become “inaccessible to envy,” Pindar declares his positive moral imperative:

Human power is marked by deity.
Only two blessings raise the feathers
blooming abundance -
Good business and good word of mouth.
If they fell to your lot -
Don't try to be Zeus: you have everything.
To a mortal - mortal!
(Isthmian songs) [*]

[*] Ibid. pp. 170 - 171.

The poet, as if by chance, remarks about himself:
May the envy of the celestials not touch
The joys of everyday life
Following which
I walk peacefully into old age and into death!
(Isthmian songs) [*]

[*] Ibid. P. 178.

Aeschylus gives a completely different meaning to the “envy of the gods,” who grasped the moral rethinking of religion by the Greeks. Hesiod and the early Greek lyricists are characterized only by “the need to find in the person of the gods (primarily in Zeus) a certain moral authority, a higher authority that patronizes the just actions of people and punishes them for crimes against public and individual morality” [*]. Thus, in ethical and theological thought, the idea of ​​Zeus as the bearer of supreme justice is gradually formed. In Aeschylus, the same divine principle is endowed with ethical functions, and divine envy acts as a component unit of divine justice, a guarantor of the preservation of the status quo of the universe.

[*] Yarkho V.N. The artistic thinking of Aeschylus: traditions and innovation // Language and culture of the ancient world. L., 1977. P. 4.

This idea can be seen most clearly in Agamemnon by Aeschylus. Introduced into the tragic plot, bloody revenge and a family curse serve Aeschylus not so much as a reflection of primitive morality, but rather for subordination to the new canon of divine justice. “The envy of the gods,” which, by the way, continues to remain anonymous in Aeschylus, although one can assume that Zeus himself is its subject, acts as a well-deserved revenge in each specific case of violation of justice and harmony. The tragedian puts the following words into the mouth of the choir:

And the one who does not deserve happiness
Once I tasted it, I was reduced to dust,
Humiliated, broken, depressed, crushed.
Pathetic obscurity is the fate
The one whose glory is an excessive burden
Dared to rise high...
(Agamemnon, 469-474) [*]

[*] Aeschylus. Tragedies. P. 199.

It is precisely thanks to its direct and rigorous action that divine envy, despite its artificially archaized form, brings even greater horror to mortals. Indicative in this sense is the scene of Agamemnon’s arrival home, in which Aeschylus, with the pen of a subtle psychologist, builds the framework of a moral and psychological conflict and creates an atmosphere of tragedy.

Clytemnestra gives an un-royally extra-magnificent reception to the conqueror of Troy, Agamemnon, and invites him to enter the palace along the purple carpet. Fearing “human condemnation” and “the envy of the gods,” Agamemnon, tormented by doubts, does not know what to do.

Clytemnestra:

I think it's well deserved
Such praise. Envy away! A lot for us
I had to suffer. So, oh my lord,
Get off the chariot, but on the ground you
Don’t step on the foot that trampled Troy, please!
Why are you delaying, slaves? You are ordered
Cover the path with carpets. So hurry up
Make a purple road for the king!
Let Justice bring him into such a house.
Which I didn’t expect...

Agamemnon:

There is no need, everyone will envy, to lay under my feet
Carpets. Such honors suit the gods.
But I’m only a mortal, and in purple
I cannot walk without fear and doubt.
Let them not honor me as a god, but as a warrior.

Clytemnestra:

Oh, don't resist my wishes...
So do not be afraid of human condemnation.

Agamemnon:

The rumor of the people is a formidable force.

Clytemnestra:

People do not envy only those who are pitiful.
He who is happy will allow himself to be defeated.
If you are compliant, you will emerge victorious.

Agamemnon:

Well, if that's what you want, untie me
Rather, shoes, my feet's servant,
And don't let them look at me enviously
Dear Gods, when I walk on the carpet:
I'm ashamed to trample into the ground with my feet
This expensive fabric is a loss to the house.
...And the gods look favorably on the meek ruler from above.
(Agamemnon, 894-943) [*]

[*] Aeschylus. Tragedies. pp. 214 - 216.

No less prone to a pessimistic perception of divine envy as a “real” factor in the life of an individual and society was Aeschylus’s younger contemporary, Sophocles. He, perhaps, gives this folk belief even more moral overtones.

Moral harmony seemed extremely unstable to Sophocles, any violation of which led to numerous victims and suffering. The tragedian sought to evoke in each of the spectators a feeling of tireless attention to his personality and his actions and to awaken a feeling of fear and respect for the gods, from whose gaze not a single human act is hidden. In the tragedy “Ayant”, Athena, addressing Odysseus, warns the hero:

Behold, Odysseus, how strong the power of the gods is.
...Be restrained, never
Do not insult the immortals with arrogant words,
Don't be arrogant if you don't
You have surpassed in wealth or strength.
Any mortal can on a single day
To fall and rise again is dear to the gods
Pious, proud - hated.
(Ayant) [*]

[*] Sophocles. Tragedies M., 1958 P. 252, 253.

The concept of “envy of the gods” acquires “premise” in Herodotus’ “History”. The position of the “father of history” receives logical completion and is characterized by the fullness of the conflict inherent in the polis individual. On the one hand, he clearly strives for maximum completeness of the events described and clarification of the pragmatic foundations of human actions, on the other hand, everything that happens is accomplished by the will of the gods and is established by fate. The philosophical and historical concept of Herodotus is internally contradictory and confusing, being, according to A.F. Losev, “a natural product of the unbridled reflection of a slave-owning citizen who first felt liberated” [*]. Inclined to see a certain instability of human well-being, Herodotus allows for divine intervention in the lives of people, which is expressed either in primordial predestination, or in divine vengeance (nemesis), or in “the envy of the gods.” The latter, according to Herodotus, is manifested in the intolerance of the gods towards the super-dimensional happiness of lower beings [**]. In a letter to the tyrant of Samos, Polycrates, the Egyptian pharaoh writes:

[*] Losev A F Ancient philosophy of history M., 1977. pp. 92 - 93.

[**] See ibid. P. 94

It's nice to know that our friend and host is happy. But still your great successes do not please me, since I know how jealous the deity [of human happiness] is. Therefore, I would like both myself and my friends to succeed in one thing and not in another, so that it would be better for me to alternately experience success and failure in my lifetime than to always be happy. After all, I have never heard of a single person who succeeded in everything, and in the end he did not end badly [*].

[*] Herodotus History. P. 151.

The author artificially gives the form of exhortations to many of the subjects in “History,” emphasizing the didactic nature of historical examples. He, however, like his predecessors, believes that the reason that gives rise to “the envy of the deity” lies in human behavior itself - his arrogance and pride. Therefore, Herodotus gives the idea of ​​​​divine envy a moralizing connotation of divine justice. In this sense, Herodotus, Aeschylus and Sophocles are united by the idea of ​​​​the gods as supreme observers. The law of retribution is the core of the relationship between the human and the divine. Arrogance is a vice, and denial or even neglect of the deity is the main source of all troubles. Thus, at a higher ethical-reflective level in the 5th century BC. e. one of the fundamental precepts of the Seven Sages is being revived - “nothing in excess” (еden agan). To illustrate this point, in the first book of the History, Herodotus cites a fictitious conversation between Solon and Croesus.

Croesus angrily told him: “Guest from Athens! But you don’t value my happiness at all...” Solon answered: “Croesus! Do you ask me, who knows that every god is envious and causes anxiety among people, about human life?.. Croesus, man is just a play of chance. I see that you own great riches and command many people, but when asked about your happiness I don’t know how to answer until I know that your life ended happily. After all, the owner of treasures is no happier than [a person] who has only a day's food... However, in any case, you need to keep in mind its outcome, how it will end. After all, the deity has already given bliss to many [for a moment], and then completely destroyed them [*].

[*] Herodotus. Story. pp. 20 - 21.

The death of the son of the king of Lydia, described by Herodotus following this conversation, appears in the form of divine retribution for the fact that Croesus considered himself lucky. After which Croesus openly admits that the Greek sage was right.

It is noteworthy that in all his nine books, Herodotus never speaks of “the envy of the deity” in the first person, but skillfully intersperses this idea into the monologues of his characters - Solon, Amasis, Artabanus, Themistocles. This to some extent prevents the final clarification of the true attitude of the “father of history” to the concept of “envy of the gods.” What is clear is that the appeal of Herodotus and the tragedians to this idea is not just a tribute to popular beliefs, but a fundamental doctrine of social and moral justice. The gods forever set the boundaries of what is available and will never allow anyone to cross them. This formulation, which most adequately reflects the theory of “envy of the gods,” echoes the words of Herodotus, put into the mouth of a Persian nobleman:

The deity, having allowed a person to taste the sweets of life, turns out to be envious [*].

[*] Ibid. P. 328.

Herodotus, however, unlike Sophocles, does not return to the veneration of the gods in a sublime mythical mood. He remains “on the paths of his semi-enlightenment pluralism” [*]. In this sense, life does not seem so pessimistic to him, and only the notes of the historian’s skepticism regarding divine envy are barely perceptible. If Herodotus never expressed his sentiments openly, then Thucydides, who lived only a generation later, completely abandoned this idea. Recognizing only a pragmatic explanation of history, Thucydides does not allow for any supernatural intervention in events, nor the law of retribution, nor the “envy of the gods.” Only once in the seventh book of his History does he mention divine envy. The Athenian strategist Nicias, noting the state of complete despondency in the army, addresses the soldiers, trying to console and encourage them:

[*] Losev A.F. Ancient philosophy of history. P. 98.

And we have reason to hope that the deity will henceforth be more merciful, since now we deserve compassion rather than the envy of the gods [*].

[*] Thucydides. Story. L., 1981. P. 347.

Thucydides does not seem to share the opinion of Nicias and, contrary to the judgment of some commentators, is not sympathetic to his attempt to raise the morale of the warrior by resorting to an outdated theory.

Euripides echoes him. Even more skeptical, he bitterly observes the decline of polis morals and exclaims:

The power has overpowered the truth in people:
Shame is no longer sacred to them, and friends
Virtue will not be found among them.
You are strong and you are right, they say
The evil one does not tremble at the wrath of God...
(Iphigenia in Aulis) [*]

[*] Euripides. Tragedies. M., 1980. T. 2. P. 486.

Finally, the concept of “envy of the gods” was completely discredited only after it was ridiculed in the comedy “Plutos” by Aristophanes. When asked by the old farmer Khremil why Plutos went blind, the god of wealth replies:

Zeus blinded me, jealous of you all.
As a child I once threatened him
That I will only visit the righteous,
Reasonable, honest: he blinded me,
So that I could not distinguish any of them.
He envies such honest people!
(Plutos) [*]

[*] Aristophanes. Comedy. In 2 vols. M., 1954. T. 2. P. 404.

This is, in general terms, the metamorphosis of the ancient belief in divine envy from Homer to Aristophanes. But the admiration for the “envy of the gods” among the Greeks does not disappear completely, and, like any popular superstition, it will dominate the minds of people for a long time. True, envy migrates from the mythological sphere to the socio-psychological sphere, becoming an integral part of the moral culture of the polis. “Envy of the gods” (phthonos theon) finally turns into “envy of people” (phthonos anthropon). This most fully reveals the sociological approach to the problem of envy as a type of social behavior. To further clarify this issue, let us consider the problem of the interaction of envy and politics in Greek democracy using the most striking example of its manifestation - the action of the institution of ostracism.

“Ostracism was not introduced for such people”

The institution of ostracism, which actually existed in Athens from 487 to 417 BC. e., was originally introduced as a weapon in the fight against tyranny. Ostracism was an honorable exile. The expelled person had to leave the country for 10 years. After this period, he could return to his homeland with full restoration of property rights and civil status. In other words, ostracism was conceived not so much for the physical destruction of the individual, but in order to nullify the ambitious plans of a particularly elevated individual through a one-time and apparently democratic act. However, very quickly, from an institution of the struggle against tyranny, ostracism turned into a means of internal struggle between warring factions, and sometimes into a means of settling personal scores. Aristotle captured this political metamorphosis of ostracism well in his time:

“...The supporters of the tyrants against whom this law was directed were ostracized; after this, in the fourth year, they began to expel from the rest of the citizens anyone who seemed too influential” [*].

[*] Aristotle. Athenian polntia. M., 1937. P. 33.

Every winter, at the Athenian public assembly, the question of the need for ostracism was discussed, but no specific names were mentioned. If the decision was positive, then all the necessary preparations were made for the vote, which took place in early spring. During the procedure itself, part of the agora was fenced off, leaving only ten gates, at which officials of the policy were located to identify citizens and their right to vote. The names of persons disliked by the demos were written on shards - ostraca. The voters passed through the gate, turning their ostraca upside down, and remained inside the fenced area in order to avoid voting again. When counting votes, a quorum of 6 thousand votes was taken into account. The one whose expulsion received the most votes had to leave Athens within ten days.

The problem of ostracism takes on a different color if you look at this unique historical and political phenomenon through the eyes of a sociologist. What considerations did the voters use when sentencing their victim? What dictated the choice at the group and individual levels in each specific case? And in general, what could be the connection between Athenian ostracism and the problem of envy that interests us?

The whole paradox of the situation of ostracism, perhaps, lies in the fact that it is not always, moreover, in most cases known to us, the motivation goes far beyond the boundaries of pure politics. Arguing on this topic, at the end of the last century, F. Nietzsche found it possible to regard ostracism in general as a manifestation of the “silent envy of the crowd.” This approach is not without foundation, given that latent envy accompanies all esoterically closed communities and societies based on egalitarian principles. Long before Nietzsche, for whom “the envy of the crowd” is both recognition of the merits of a strong personality and at the same time the main obstacle to the development of his creative potential, F. Bacon in “Essays...” saw positive aspects in the social functions of envy. “As for envy in public life, it also has good sides - which cannot be said about personal envy. For envy in public life is a kind of ostracism that affects those who have exalted themselves too much, and therefore serves as a bridle for those in power” [*].

[*] Bacon F. Works. In 2 vols. M., 1972. T. 2. P. 370.

Such assessments of ostracism apparently became possible in the research thought of modern and contemporary times only thanks to the rich literary heritage of the philosophizing moralist of late antiquity - Plutarch.

Plutarch the biographer always sought to individualize the historical characters he described. To do this, he seeks out details from their personal lives that, as a rule, are not contained in impartial historical works of the classical era. He skillfully inserts historical anecdotes into the plot outline of biographies, without building long chains of flat moral reasoning. And despite all the efforts of hypercritical historians of the 19th century, Plutarch’s digressions, weakly reliable, of course, from the point of view of objective history, evidence and anecdotes provide indispensable assistance in clarifying not so much the narrative outline, but the internal climate of democratic Athens.

In the internal political struggle of the Greek city-states, Plutarch saw, first of all, the struggle of ambitious individuals, busy only with satisfying their passions and claims. S. Ya. Lurie divided Plutarch’s “great people” into two groups: moderate and extreme ambitious. Both share the desire to take first place in the state, but they are distinguished by the means of achieving this. If a moderate ambitious person is generally quite honest and incorruptible in his personal life, then an extreme one enriches himself, steals, extorts, negotiates with enemies in case the enemy gains the upper hand [*]. Serving the interests of one’s own career brings almost all ambitious people into conflict with the demos, which is why Plutarch repeatedly expresses the idea of ​​people’s envy of distinguished individuals. But this envy did not always remain “silent.” A brilliant illustration of these views is Plutarch's biography of outstanding figures from the heyday of Athenian democracy.

[*] See: Lurie S. Ya. Two stories of the fifth century // Plutarch. Selected bnographies. M.; L., 1941. P. 19.

Themistocles does not appear in Plutarch's version in the best light: the biographer portrays him, like many of his predecessors, quite tendentiously. Dubious origins, insatiable ambition, selfishness, selfishness, greed, rapid rise to fame and wealth - these are just some of the features of his portrait. And having embarked on the path of secret negotiations with the Persians, Themistocles finally dissociated himself from the Athenian demos.

“...Themistocles was ostracized in order to destroy his authority and prominence; This is what the Athenians usually did with everyone whose power they considered burdensome to themselves and incompatible with democratic equality.

(And then, as if developing this idea, Plutarch moves from a sociologically sharpened interpretation of the essence of ostracism to explaining it through envy.)

Ostracism was not a punishment, but a means to appease and reduce envy, which rejoices in the humiliation of outstanding people and, so to speak, breathing hostility towards them, exposes them to this dishonor.”

(Themistocles) [*]

[*] Plutarch. Comparative biographies. In 3 volumes. M., 1961. T. I. P. 161.

The direct opposite of Themistocles is Aristides, who, as a result of rivalry with him, was ostracized in 482 BC. e Aristide is the embodiment of honesty and moderation in everything. His selfless service to the interests of Athens and its allies made him famous among his contemporaries and descendants, who gave him the nickname “The Just.” However, gradually, as Plutarch writes:

“The nickname of the Just, which at first brought Aristides the love of the Athenians, later turned into a source of hatred towards him, mainly because Themistocles spread rumors that Aristides, examining and deciding all matters himself, abolished the courts and, unnoticed by his fellow citizens, became an autocratic ruler - that’s just did not acquire guards, and the people, boasting of their victory and considering themselves worthy of the greatest honors, looked with displeasure at everyone who was elevated above the crowd by fame or a big name. And so, having gathered from all over the country into the city, the Athenians ostracized Aristides, hiding their hatred of glory under the name of fear of tyranny"

(Aristide) [*]

[*] Plutarch Comparative biographies In 3 vols. T. 1. P 413

And again, Plutarch almost literally repeats the same idea about the inseparability of envy and ostracism, which appears as his leitmotif at every mention of this institution.

“Ostracism was not a punishment for any kind of action; for the sake of decency it was called “pacification and curbing of pride and excessive power,” but in fact it turned out to be a means of quelling hatred, and a rather merciful means, the feeling of ill will found a way out not in anything irreparable, but only in the ten-year exile of the one who caused this feeling.”

(Aristide) [*]

[*] Ibid.

The biographer concludes his story about Aristide's exile with a historical anecdote, which, apparently, in his opinion, should have strengthened the readers' idea of ​​Aristide's extreme honesty and justice. In itself, the incident described by Plutarch may be apocryphal, but it is quite indicative from the point of view of the mechanisms of the formation of envy in egalitarian communities.

“They say that when they were inscribing the shards, some illiterate, uncouth peasant handed Aristide - the first one who came across him - a shard, and asked him to write the name of Aristide. He was surprised and asked if Aristide had offended him in any way. “No, - answered the peasant, “I don’t even recognize this man, but I’m tired of hearing “Fair” and “Fair” at every step!.. Aristide did not answer anything, wrote his name and returned the shard.”

(Aristide) [*]

[*] Ibid. P. 414.

In this fragment, Plutarch tries to outline the socio-psychological nature of the phenomenon of collective envy. Under conditions of its dominance, the activity of any individual that deviates from generally accepted and average norms of behavior causes a negative assessment of the collective. At such historical moments, the behavior of the Athenian demos was dictated, on the one hand, by the institutions and traditions of civil society, with its inherent communal hostility to nobility and wealth, and the desire to maintain an artificial balance in the social distribution of power and material wealth. That is why Plutarch specifically emphasizes that “ostracism was never applied to the poor, but only to noble and powerful people, whose power was hated by their fellow citizens...” (Aristides) [*].

[*] Plutarch. Comparative biographies. In 3 volumes. T. 1. P. 408.

On the other hand, in such situations, the psychology of the demos is determined by the norms of crowd behavior, that is, a random gathering of people united in a given specific period of time by a passing interest. And in such cases, as we know, people’s moral orientations and social attitudes can change dramatically. For it is the emotional side of the psyche that first appears, transforming under the influence of moods and leaders who are able to capture these moods, express and strengthen them, and sometimes pass off their own desires as the mood of the demos. Plutarch clearly shows how the psychology of the crowd and the ideology of the polis are intertwined when describing the last historical ostracism in Athens in 417 BC. e.:

“The discord between Niknemus and Alcibiades was in full swing, the position of both was precarious and dangerous, for one of them was bound to fall under ostracism. Alcibiades was hated for his behavior and feared for his impudence... Nicias was envied because of his wealth, and, most importantly, his whole way of life made him think that this man had neither kindness nor love for the people, that his quarrelsomeness and all his oddities stem from sympathy for the oligarchy. The people, splitting into two parties, gave free rein to the most notorious scoundrels, including Hyperbolus from Perited. It was not strength that made this man impudent, but audacity gave him strength, and the glory that he achieved was disgrace for the city. Hyperbolus believed that ostracism did not threaten him, realizing that he was more likely to be put in the stocks. He hoped that after the expulsion of one of the two husbands, he, as an equal, would act as a rival to the other; it was known that he rejoiced at the discord between them and stirred up the people against both. The supporters of Nicias and Alcibiades understood this scoundrel and, secretly conspiring among themselves, settled their differences, united and won, so that it was not Nicias and Alcibiades who suffered from ostracism, but Hyperbolus.”

(Nikiy) [*]

[*] Ibid. 1963. T. 2. P. 222.

If we try to systematize all of Plutarch’s messages about ostracism and consider them from the point of view of Plutarch’s assessment of the role of envy in politics, a remarkable picture emerges. The subject of envy has always been the people. “None of the poor, but only representatives of rich houses” were ostracized. At the same time, the motivation for choosing the expelled person in each specific case could be different, although Plutarch reduces it to two main points: (1) “to crush his excessively elevated authority” (Themistocles); out of “envy of his glory” and because the people “were hostile to the glory and popularity of prominent people” (Aristides); or (2) wealth became the object of envy (Nikiy). About Pericles Plutarch wrote:

“In his youth, Pericles was very afraid of the people: in himself he seemed similar to the tyrant Peisistratus; his pleasant voice, ease and quickness of language in conversation, this similarity instilled fear in very old people. And since he owned wealth, came from a noble family, and had influential friends, he was afraid of ostracism...”

(Pericles) [*]

[*] Plutarch. Comparative biographies. In 3 volumes. T. 1. P. 200.

Plutarch always links the very procedure of ostracism with envy, slander and hostility of fellow citizens towards their leaders. As if focusing all these points together, Plutarch, in his biography of Aristides, wrote that after Themistocles was expelled from Athens, the people, having become insolent and dissolute, raised in their midst many sycophants who persecuted noble and influential people, causing envy of them among the masses; for many ordinary citizens were haunted by the happy life and influence of these people [*].

[*] See ibid. pp. 200, 201.

Finally, when in 417 BC. e. Hyperbolus was expelled, who had previously incited the Athenian demos against Alcibiades and Nicias and did not at all suspect that he himself could be expelled, since, as the biographer writes, “before not a single person of simple origin had been subjected to this punishment,” the people’s joy on this occasion soon gave way to annoyance, because this decision discredited the very institution of ostracism:

“...after all, there is a kind of honor inherent in punishment. It was believed that for Thucydides, Aristides and similar persons, ostracism was a punishment, but for Hyperbole it was an honor and an extra reason for boasting, since the scoundrel suffered the same fate as the most worthy. The comedian Plato says something like this about him somewhere.

Although he accepted his punishment rightly,
There is no way to combine it with his brand.
Ostracism was not created for people like him.”
(Nikiy) [*]

[*] Ibid. T. 2. P. 222.

It is striking how much the model of feelings of envy, examined using the example of ostracism, resembles the “envy of the gods” already described in the previous section. In fact, here and there we are faced with established boundaries of norms of behavior, the violation of which is strictly punished. And if in the concept of “envy of the gods” Zeus acts as a guarantor of social and moral justice, then in the era of the heyday of democracy, the demos becomes an indisputable guarantor, and the will of the people acquires an aura of divinity. In other words, ostracism, repeating the “envy of the gods”, but in its desacralized form, acts as an institutional means of manifestation of envy and, therefore, as a type of social behavior. In ancient times, it was the Athenian democracy that provided the greatest opportunities for revealing all the abilities of the individual, but at the same time it turned out to be envious towards those who achieved more, just as “the deity, having allowed a person to taste the sweets of life, turns out to be envious” [*].

[*] Herodotus. Story. P. 328.

So, having traced the evolution of the feeling of envy, we again return to the original thesis about its functioning only among equals. Here it is appropriate to recall the utopian idea, dominant in the minds of the enlightened Greeks of the high classical period, that in a socially just society there would be no envy. A contemporary of Euripides, the Athenian tragedian Agathon argued: “There would be no envy in human life if we were all in equal conditions” [*]. Plato echoes him:

[*] Quote. by: Walcot P. Envy and the Greeks. A Study of Human Behavior. Warminster, 1978.

“The noblest morals, perhaps, arise in such a community where wealth and poverty do not live side by side. After all, there will be no place for arrogance, injustice, jealousy, or envy.”

(Plato. Laws, 679 v - c) [*]

[*] Plato. Essays. In 3 vols. M., 1972. T. 3. Part 2. P. 148.

In this regard, the dominant trend in the political thought of the ancient Greeks becomes clear: the idealization of Sparta, especially the internal structure of its “community of equals,” did not arise out of nowhere. The mixed structure of the state, attributed to the legendary legislator Lycurgus, excluded any possibility of the rise of one individual over a collective of equal Spartans. It is no coincidence, therefore, that when speaking about limiting the powers of kings in favor of the ephors, Plutarch focuses the attention of readers on the fact that, “having abandoned excessive power, the Spartan kings at the same time got rid of both hatred and envy...” [*]. Although the competitive foundations in society remained, which is especially clearly evident from the Spartan system of education, the establishment of a “community of equals” prevented the exorbitant fame, success, popularity and, especially, wealth of an individual citizen.

[*] Plutarch. Comparative biographies. In 3 volumes. T. 1. P. 58

In conclusion, we emphasize once again that there was no single model of envy in Greek society. It is also multifaceted in its forms of manifestation: from simple rivalry, jealousy and professional envy to the “envy of the gods” and the collective envy of people in general. Ancient authors understood the dual nature of envy (destructive and creative).

"The Root of All Evil"

Ancient Greek thinkers quite clearly saw the difference between “malicious envy” and envy that has a beneficial effect on people, namely competitiveness. The idea of ​​the dialectical nature of the phenomenon is characteristic of the Sophists and Plato. In “The Republic” he talks about the existence of good and evil in every thing [*], and in “Menexene”, telling about the fate of Athens after the Greco-Persian wars, he writes:

[*] See: Plato. State//Works. In 3 vols. M., 1971 T. 3. Part 1. P. 440.

This is how difficult the entire city bore on its shoulders, rising up against the barbarians to defend itself and other peoples related in language. When peace came and the city was in the prime of its glory, a misfortune occurred that usually falls to the lot of those who prosper among people - rivalry, which then turned into envy [*].

[*] See: Plato. Dialogues M., 1986. P. 105.

Guided by these considerations, Plato repeatedly, especially in the Laws, condemns envy and envious people in contrast to prudence and rationality and calls: “Let each of us care about virtue without envy.” For Plato, envy always remains the most important human vice, hindering progress towards true virtue.

Aristotle's attitude to the nature of envy is close to Plato's. Summing up the entire previous development of ethical thought, Aristotle does not introduce new accents into the understanding of this phenomenon, but surprisingly harmoniously fits envy into his teaching about virtues. According to Aristotle, an individual cannot be virtuous initially by nature, but only becomes so. Because of this, Stagirite proposes to distinguish three sides in a person’s state of mind. Extremes are human vices. By overcoming them and, as it were, choosing a relative mean between them, each individual person becomes virtuous, for in medio stat virtus (“virtue is in the middle”). On this basis, Aristotle develops models of specific virtues. In “Rhetoric” he links envy to the feeling of rivalry, and in “Nicomachean Ethics”, defining the nature of moral indignation, he contrasts it with two vicious extremes - envy and schadenfreude:

“Indignation (nemesis) is the middle ground between envy and gloating. Both feelings deserve blame, but the indignant one deserves approval. Indignation is grief that goods belong to the unworthy; indignant - one who is upset by such things. He will also be upset when he sees that someone is suffering undeservedly. Such are indignation and the indignant. An envious person behaves in the opposite way. He will be upset by the prosperity of any person, whether it is deserved or undeserved. Likewise, a malicious person will be happy about the misfortune of any person, deserved or undeserved. The indignant person is not like that; he is, as it were, a kind of middle ground between them” [*].

[*] Aristotle. Works in 4 vols. M., 1983 T. 4. P. 322.

On the other hand, our, especially everyday, assessments are largely imbued with the spirit of Christian alienation of envy. Already in the first centuries of our era, the “church fathers” rejected the dual, dialectical nature of envy, and the phenomenon itself became the object of merciless and accusatory criticism. Dion Chrysostomos, Basil of Caesarea, and Cyprian of Carthage devote their works specifically to the phenomenon of envy; Clement of Alexandria, Augustine the Blessed and Boethius devote significant space to it in their works.

In the Old Testament, the concept of envy as such is practically absent. The Hebrew ginah relates more to our understanding of the “envious eye” than to envy as a moral emotion. In the New Testament, on the contrary, envy and jealousy are mentioned many times, although in the plot narration envy appears virtually once: through it the attitude of the Jewish high priests towards Jesus Christ is described. The Gospel of Mark says this:

“Immediately in the morning the chief priests with the elders and scribes and the entire Sanhedrin held a meeting, and, having bound Jesus, they took him away and handed him over to Pilate. Pilate asked Him: Are you the King of the Jews? He answered and said to him, “You speak.” And the chief priests accused Him of many things. Pilate asked Him again: “Are you not answering?” you see how many accusations are against you. But Jesus did not answer anything to this either, so Pilate marveled. For every holiday, he released to them one prisoner they asked for. Then there was a man in bonds named Barabbas, with his accomplices, who, during the rebellion, committed murder. And the people began to shout and ask Pilate for what he had always done for them.

He answered and said to them: Do you want me to release the King of the Jews to you? For he knew that the high priests had betrayed Him out of envy” [*].

[*] Gospel of Mark: 15, 1 - 10; Wed Gospel of Matthew: 27, 11 - 18

All other mentions of envy in New Testament literature, harmoniously integrated into the evangelical moral doctrine that denies ancient virtues and the competitive spirit, come down to three main points. Firstly, any desire for competition in society for a Christian is immoral, since from passion “for competitions and verbal disputes, from which envy, strife, slander, crafty suspicions, etc. arise.” (1 Tim.: 6.4). Secondly, Christian morality is characterized by the identification of morality with love, elevated to the rank of a universal moral absolute, and therefore “love does not envy” (1 Cor.: 13.2 - 11). Finally, in accordance with Christian doctrine, man is like God, but not completely, and remains an earthly, sensual and mortal being. And, unlike ancient anthropomorphism, its empirical existence always appears as a sin [*].

[*] The idea of ​​the sinfulness and “carnal” nature of envy is repeated several times in the New Testament. See: Gospel of Mark: 7, 20 - 23; 1 Epistle of Peter: 2, 1; I Epistle to the Corinthians: 3, 3; 2 Corinthians: 12, 20; Epistle to Titus: 3, 3.

“The works of the flesh are known, they are: adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, sorcery, enmity, quarrels, envy, anger, strife, discord (temptations), heresies, hatred, murder, drunkenness, disorderly conduct and the like” [*] .

[*] Epistle to the Galatians: 5, 19 - 21.

All these components of the Gospel teaching on envy were constantly developed in the Christian theology of the Middle Ages, but the main emphasis was still placed on the sinfulness of envy. Cypian of Carthage declared envy “the root of all evil” (radix est malorum omnium). Augustine the Blessed was inclined to further dramatize the Gospel teaching about sin. Finally, as if completing the ancient stage of the history of Christianity, in the 4th - 5th centuries Evagrius and Cassian developed a hierarchy of sins, seven of which were later declared “mortal”. Among them is envy. The IV Lutheran Council of 1215, which established mandatory annual confession for a righteous Christian, required the church to be especially vigilant in recognizing envy. Thus, under the “slogan” of mortal sin, envy passed through the entire thousand-year history of the European Middle Ages.

The modern moral worldview in understanding envy inherits both the rationalistic-dialectical tradition of Ancient Greece and the “sinful thread” of Christianity. People are ashamed, openly afraid of being caught in this “infection,” although they may verbally acknowledge its positive social functions. One must have the honesty and genius of Miguel de Unamuno [*] to admit that envy can be an immanent part of the “national character”, a comprehensive social and moral trait of any egalitarian society, despite the absolute denial of this fact by people intimidated by the thousand-year persecution of the Inquisition and churches for any glimpses of this feeling.

[*] See: Unamuno M. de. Spanish envy//Favorites. In 2 vols. M., 1981. T. 2. P. 249-257.

Only by realizing the duality of modern moral consciousness - the result of a mixture of Greek and Christian paradigms of envy - can one deeply understand the words of F. de La Rochefoucauld, with which we began our essay: “People often boast of the most criminal passions, but in envy, a timid and bashful passion, no one doesn’t dare admit” [*].

[*] La Rochefoucauld F. de. Maxims and Moral Reflections C. 8.

Ethics of business relations, test, 45 tasks.

Exercise 1.
1. The term “ethics” was coined by:
Confucius
Plato
Aristotle

2. The first European moralist is considered:
Homer
Hesiod
Hippocrates

4. The thesis of non-resistance to evil through violence was put forward by:
L.N. Tolstoy
F.M.Dostoevsky
I.S. Turgenev

5. Ethics and morality are related to each other as follows:
Science and subject matter
Theory and practice
Rule and action

6.Which of the concepts does not reflect the origin of morality:
Naturalistic
Sociological
Utopian

7. Morality is...:
A set of rules and norms of professional activity
A set of specific rules and norms of human behavior
A set of universal human rules and norms of behavior

Task 2.
1.Which of the following properties does morality have:
Invariance
Imperativeness
Immanence

2. Business communication is...:
Formal communication, when there is no desire to understand and take into account the personality characteristics of the interlocutor;
When another person is assessed as a necessary or interfering object
When the characteristics of personality, character, age are taken into account, but the interests of the business are more significant than personal differences

3.What is the difference between effective business communication and ineffective one?
Effective carries a greater meaning
Effective is distinguished by a clearly defined goal.
Effective achieves the set goal

4.The communicative side of communication reflects the desire of communication partners to:
exchange of information
expanding the topic of communication
strengthening the information impact on the partner

5.The interactive aspect of communication is manifested in:
The need for partners to comply with established communication norms
The desire for superiority over a communication partner
Striving to establish optimal relationships

6. The perceptual side of communication expresses the need of the subjects of communication for:
establishing friendly relationships
empathy, mutual understanding
maintaining a high status in communication

7.Which of the following recommendations is contrary to effective business communication?
Strive to take the initiative in communication, get people to listen to you more, try to show your erudition
While receiving information, do not interrupt the speaker, do not give advice, do not criticize
Make yourself heard and understood
Task 3.

1. The semantic thesis of business communication “separate people from the problem” is:
Do not attach importance to likes and dislikes in business communication
Focus on the issue being discussed, not on the personality of the partner
Resolving business communication problems without taking into account the personal characteristics of the partner

2.The style of business communication is:
Behavior in business communication
Norms of communication in a specific situation
Individual typological features of interaction between partners

3. Identification is:
Sympathy or empathy for another
A way of knowing another person
The process of establishing contacts using the algorithm

4.Stereotyping is
Cognition based on the principle of “like to like”
The process of organizing the information received
The process of assessing the level of business communication

5. Reflection is:
Arousing emotional feelings in a partner
Ability to focus on yourself
Human reaction to the peculiarities of business communication

6.To influence the personal relationships of employees, the manager must:
Define relationship goals
Personally intervene in the relationship
Limit the development of relationships

7.What is meant by transactional analysis in communication?
Determining the direction of behavior in communication
Study of the basic characteristics of communication
Analysis of partners’ “moves” in communication

Additional Information

1.Competence in business communication is:
Compliance of qualities with functional responsibilities
Ability to objectively evaluate relationships
Ability to make necessary contacts

2. Analyzing his relationships with subordinates, the manager must:
Determine how a subordinate reacts to authoritarian orders
Monitor the development of relationships
Invite a qualified consultant

3. If at the planning meeting it turns out that the plan has not been fulfilled, then the manager should:
Ask subordinates to make their suggestions
Inform them of planned measures to rectify the situation
Fire the worst performers

4. Two-way contact between superior and subordinate is very important because:
The boss can check whether his orders are understood correctly
A subordinate can ask a question and clarify information
People can't work without it

5. An approach that allows you to assess the conflict, discuss and find a solution that satisfies everyone involves:
Smoothing out the conflict
Escalation of the conflict to open confrontation
Involvement of a third party

6. A manager who notices that a subordinate is showing one or another desire (for example, actively strives to communicate with others) must:
Punish him
Place in conditions that make communication difficult
Place in conditions where such behavior is part of the work process

7. Personal relationships objectively arise between people. It can be argued that:
Healthy relationships contribute to achieving organizational goals
The nature of personal relationships has nothing to do with successful work
Personal relationships should be strictly limited

Task 5.
1. To motivate a person to do something, it is necessary, first of all:
Create conditions for doing work
Convince him to want to do it
Show kindness and a friendly approach

2. To attract someone to your side, you must first of all:
Convince him that I am a sincere friend
Give him the impression of your importance
Give the person the opportunity to “save face”

3.an expression that does not contribute to dialogue in a conversation:
you will be interested to know...
I want to talk to you...
I want to talk to you...

4.How to behave with an uninterested interlocutor:

Ask informative questions and make the conversation engaging
Provide an opportunity to formulate an interim conclusion
Thank you for your contribution to the conversation

5.How to deal with an impatient interlocutor:
Find out and consider issues together
Don't allow any criticism
Always remain cool and competent

6.how to behave with an insecure interlocutor:
interest him and invite him to take an equal position in the conversation
encourage him, help him formulate thoughts
try to find out what interests him personally

7. “Body language” is:
Motor reaction of a person to the circumstances of communication
A means of purposefully influencing an interlocutor
Receiving and transmitting information using gestures, postures, facial expressions

Task 6.
1. how do you understand the saying “nature gave man two ears, but only one tongue”:
2. Conflict is:
3. A conflict situation is:
4.An incident is:
5.The cause of the conflict is:
6. What are the typical causes of conflicts: violation of group norms; low training; inadequacy of internal attitude to status, etc.

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