The country's chief chemist. Awards of the departments of the chemical industry of the USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry of the USSR
This year is special for Chemistry and Life. Fifty years ago, in April 1965, the first issue of our magazine was published. It appeared on the wave of chemicalization, when the USSR decided to build Big Chemistry. The main ideologist and organizer of this construction was Leonid Arkadyevich Kostandov, who would have turned one hundred years old this year. This is such a double anniversary, and each one is very dear to us.
But today our conversation is about Leonid Arkadyevich, about a great statesman. During his twenty years in power (1965–1980 - Minister of Chemical Industry of the USSR, 1980–1984 - Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR), he created a powerful world-class chemical industry. He has hundreds (!) of new and reconstructed chemical production facilities built in different republics. Through his efforts, over the course of twenty years, the share of chemical industry products in the national economy has doubled. He, like a powerful locomotive, pulled the entire economy of the country. So many things and accomplishments in just 20 years!
If the pace set by L.A. Kostandov had been maintained even after 1984, when he died, then now our chemical industry would be as powerful as in the USA, and would pull other industries along with it. Kostandov created an industrial reserve for decades to come, which had to be developed. It was this foundation that in its time could become a launching pad for the economic breakthrough of the new Russia. But everything turned out the other way around. Over the past 25 years, our government has not so much built as destroyed the chemical industry. Only now, when much has been destroyed, continuity has been lost, personnel have been lost, time has been lost, a technological lag has arisen - only now has the understanding returned that we need our own industry. And for this we need such attractive, talented and responsible leaders as Kostandov.
Alas, in the current government there are no statesmen who could be brought closer to Kostandov at least a few steps - neither in competence, nor in efficiency, nor in the level of state thinking, nor in internal energy, nor in strategic vision, and even a lot of other things. Oh, if only Leonid Arkadyevich were with us now!
Kostandov cannot be returned, but we can try to learn lessons from his stunning practice of public administration and service to the Fatherland. The lessons are extremely relevant for today's Russia.
Competence
What do we expect from the authorities? The main thing is fairness, as well as honesty, efficiency, focus on results in the interests of the country and people, and of course, competence.
I recently got into a conversation with a young man. I ask: what is your education? He says the manager. Got it, manager. And in what industry? What specialization? What other specialization? I am a manager by training and can manage in any field. Okay, I say. And you, as a manager, can evaluate the prospects for the production of ethylene copolymer with maleic anhydride for electrical engineering, chlorinated polyethylene for rubber technology, compressed natural gas as a gasoline substitute, modification of acetate fibers... Wait, what are you talking about? I didn't understand a single word! I'm a manager!
Meanwhile, all of the above are just a few questions that were considered during one day by the USSR Minister of Chemical Industry L.A. Kostandov, a manager of the highest standard, an engineer by training.
Where did these strange and dangerous illusions come from that a non-specialist can manage this or that sector of the economy? That people who do not understand the essence of scientific work and teaching can lead science and education, officials who do not distinguish a valve from a fitting and do not understand the deep connections between industries - industry, people who do not know the essence of chemical transformations and technologies - the chemical industry... Over the past 25 years, the economy in our country has been turned upside down. For some reason, the main people in it were financiers and lawyers - specialists in purely service professions.
The basis of the economy has always been, is and will be production, and the job of lawyers and financiers is to serve this main economic process. A lawyer, financier and just a manager cannot understand the intricacies and features of any production simply because they lack education and relevant experience. This means that they cannot manage the economy effectively. And there is nothing to talk about industrial policy at all, because they do not have an adequate vision of scientific and technological progress and its future and they are not able to formulate this policy in the interests of the country’s economy. There is no substance behind their loud words about “innovation”, “energy efficiency”, “increasing the competitiveness of production”, “creating industries with high added value”. That's why we have problems with industry. Even now, when, under sanctions, competition in the domestic market is decreasing, production in the country is falling! They, the current managers, should be silent and listen to what experienced specialists have to say. But it’s the latter who are silent, and who’s asking them? And even if they say it, who will understand them?
Today we see total incompetence and lack of professionalism at all levels of government and management. This is a disaster for the economy, that is, industry. Because personnel really decides everything. And today, more than ever, we need competent people in government. People like Leonid Arkadyevich Kostandov. Only then will we be able to boost the economy.
Whatever you say, in Soviet times they knew how to work with personnel. They looked closely at the successes of lower-level managers, and if they proved through their actions their capacity, their ambition in the good sense of the word, their ability to solve problems and work with people, then they moved them up. It was a positive selection, selection based on deeds, not words. Leonid Arkadyevich in this sense is a classic example of a specialist who has gone from an engineer to the Minister of Chemical Industry of the USSR. His entire professional life and destiny are a series of continuous tests of increasing complexity.
It all started in Chirchik at an electrochemical plant, where in 1940 a young specialist, Kostandov, was sent, having graduated from the Moscow Institute of Chemical Engineering with honors. Here, the world's largest production of hydrogen using the electrochemical method was created using domestic equipment. In essence, Leonid Arkadyevich had to build this enterprise, master new equipment, train machinists and machine operators, and launch production. He passed this first test with honor, and in August 1941 he was appointed chief engineer of the plant, which, now that the war had begun, received the status of a strategic enterprise - after all, it produced the substances necessary for the manufacture of explosives.
In the fall of 1941, the State Defense Committee decided to quickly build two new workshops for the production of high-explosive aircraft bombs with a new explosive at two chemical enterprises - the Chirchik Electrochemical Plant and the Kemerovo Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant. The deadline was set - a year.
All design work was carried out by the State Institute of Nitrogen Industry (GIAP), and built by L. A. Kostandov. Then he proposed a daring, but, as it turned out, very correct solution - to build a workshop on two levels. Air bomb casings arrived at the top one - here they were prepared for equipment. Then, along a special overpass invented by Kostandov, the bombs were lowered to the first level, where they were filled with explosives. Moreover, to slow them down, since bombs are a heavy thing, Kostandov suggested using a rubber roller from the T-34 tank. This greatly simplified the technological process. Along the way, he reconstructed and improved the nitric acid synthesis column to make explosives. And in general, he demonstrated that he can solve and simplify technical problems. He did not leave the workshop for days, and the workshop was launched exactly on time. The first echelon was loaded with aerial bombs marked “Object 215 of the Chirchik Electrochemical Plant named after. I.V. Stalin" on the night of January 1, 1943 and was sent to the Kalinin Front. Then, in 1943, Kostandov received the first government award - the gratitude of the People's Commissar of the Chemical Industry M. G. Pervukhin.
Keeping your word and observing the stated deadlines, looking for the optimal technical solution that simplifies the technological process, spending days and nights in the workshop during commissioning work so that nothing is missed - these are the lessons Leonid Arkadyevich learned for himself and always adhered to these principles, even being in the rank of Minister of Chemical Industry.
All 13 years that he worked at the plant in Chirchik were a daily battle with challenges and circumstances, a battle to introduce new technological processes in the shortest possible time. And each time Kostandov was the leader of the next project.
For example - heavy water. In the forties, the country urgently needed it for a nuclear project. In 1944, the government set the task: make water, and in the fall of 1945, the first workshop for producing heavy water using the electrochemical method was launched in Chirchik. A little later, a pilot plant was built here, where heavy water was made in a cheaper way - from deuterium obtained by low-temperature rectification of liquid hydrogen. The case was completely new, there were no analogues from which to learn. And at first, the distillation columns exploded one after another. For a long time they could not understand what was the matter. Kostandov got to the bottom of it.
He realized that the cause of the explosions was oxygen. Small amounts of it, present in the initial hydrogen, solidified during rectification at a very low temperature (24–26 K), accumulated in the column packing and provoked an explosion. Therefore, the process required high-purity hydrogen - with an oxygen content of no more than 10–10 mole shares. However, at that time we did not have oxygen analyzers of such high sensitivity, not only for factories, but even for research purposes. And then Kostandov, together with his fellow engineers and designers, began calculations and computational experiments. Thanks to them, it was possible to build a system in which the distillation column itself became an analyzer of oxygen in hydrogen.
In 1949, Kostandov was appointed director of the Chirchik Electrochemical Plant. Why? After all, he was still very young - a thirty-four-year-old engineer. Yes, because he has already proven that he is capable of much, and most importantly, he knows how to take responsibility, get things done and work with people.
Directorship at a large enterprise, especially a chemical one at that difficult time, was akin to sitting on a powder keg, and in the literal sense of the word. Shortly after Kostandov’s appointment, an explosion occurred at the plant - an autoclave for direct synthesis of nitric acid was torn into pieces, seven people were injured, and one-story houses were demolished a kilometer from the plant. The local NKVD department reported to Moscow that the entire plant had been destroyed and its entire staff had died. The NKVD accusation of sabotage was repelled, but the true causes of the accident still had to be figured out. Academicians and other specialists were called in to help. It turned out that the explosion was caused by dichloroethane that got into the autoclave.
Kostandov learned a lifelong lesson from this accident. Meticulous attention to detail, reliability of equipment, and personnel safety became his priorities - the priorities of the future minister. In general, chemical production teaches you to think about the consequences - a good skill for working in government.
For thirteen years in production, which was constantly mastering new technological processes, Kostandov went through fire, water and copper pipes, almost literally. They provided invaluable experience. This is the compulsory, competency-building vocational school that any industrial manager must undergo to be effective. The state rewarded his honest work with complete dedication with two prizes - the Stalin Prize (1951) for the introduction at his plant of the progressive technology of gasification of low-grade coals in a fluidized bed, developed at GIAP, and the Lenin Prize (1960) for a new industrial process for producing heavy water. And this was another impressive lesson for Kostandov - success can only be achieved in the union of production workers and industrial science, and there is no other way of development.
Kostandov worked as director for only four years. Of course, the Ministry of Chemical Industry wanted to get such a bright leader. And it got it. In 1953, he was appointed head of the Main Directorate of the Nitrogen Industry, which he led for five years, then he worked at the State Committee for Science and Technology, and in 1965 he became minister.
The minister came out of it well. The highest professionalism and competence that he acquired during the first 25 years of his career allowed him to quickly become the country's leading chemist. And not just a chemist. There simultaneously existed a mechanic, a scientist, an engineer, a marketer, a financier, an economist, and a politician. He spoke with representatives of any of these professions as equals, and gave many a head start. He had enormous authority in the industry, he was valued for his deep engineering erudition, wisdom, national scope, breadth of views and strategic vision of the future.
Everyone who worked with Kostandov noted his amazing memory - once he saw the installation, he unmistakably remembered its main parameters: the power of the unit, the number of reactors, productivity, hardware design and, most importantly, the people working on it.
His authority in the field of chemistry and petrochemistry was unparalleled not only in our country, but also in the world. He traveled a lot to different countries to see new chemical production facilities, new technical solutions and products. And although the host companies hid their know-how, Kostandov saw through all the technological processes. Here is a typical story that happened in Italy, when our government delegation was shown the plant of the ENI concern. The head of the ENI concern leads a tour of the plant - look to the right, look to the left, he talks, skillfully omitting technical details. L. A. Kostandov delicately asks for clarification of details and hears in response:
This is know-how...
In that case,” Leonid Arkadyevich retorts, “I’ll tell you about them myself.”
And then he names the main parameters: pressure, temperature, duration of the process, volume of finished product... Needless to say, what a shock the Italian director had. It is unlikely that foreign colleagues have seen another minister who would have such a deep knowledge of all chemical processes and apparatus, chemical production in general.
Despite the abundance of obligatory affairs of the minister, he continued to produce technical ideas and solutions that were picked up by factories. For example, he insisted on producing chlorine by electrolysis under pressure to intensify the process. And he not only insisted, but proposed specific new technical solutions. As a result, an original installation appeared, which was patented in the USA, England, France, Germany, Japan and other countries. Today, electrolysis under pressure is used in the membrane method for producing chlorine and pure caustic soda. Or at a meeting at the Redkinsky pilot plant, where they discussed technologies for the purification and preparation of solvents, he suddenly began asking the speaker questions from physical chemistry on phase equilibria and azeotropic systems, which amazed everyone present - and how does he know this?
Kostandov burst into the enterprise like a whirlwind. I came not to give a beating, but to see everything with my own eyes, to support, inspire and help. It never occurred to anyone to offer him a guest route - he knew all the nooks and crannies of all the factories in the industry too well. He noticed everything, understood everything, talked to anyone, regardless of hierarchy, instantly mastered the situation, no matter how difficult it may seem to others. And then, at a meeting in the director’s office, he summed up the results in a quiet but convincing voice, formulating the decision clearly, without doubting for a second that it was correct.
In the early 80s, when Kostandov was already deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in a conversation with someone close to him, he said: “Our country will perish from the incompetence of the authorities.” He knew what he was talking about. Management effectiveness is a derivative of competence. But not only. Competence breeds confidence, and confidence breeds conviction. Kostandov, with his reinforced concrete arguments, could convert any member of the government, any director and ordinary employee. He was incredibly persuasive and therefore could captivate, inspire and lead. He was incredibly effective because he knew the matter thoroughly and had a clear vision of the goal.
What idea was this statesman devoted to? What goal were you going towards, conquering new heights step by step? It can be expressed in one short word - chemicalization.
Chemicalization
Today, polymers and plastics are an integral part of our everyday life, and the question does not even arise: “How could it be otherwise?” But just 60 years ago it was different. At that time, the idea that new unusual polymer materials, light, transparent, bright and durable, would fill our entire lives, looked like a fairy tale, and against the backdrop of the then domestic industry - simply an irresponsible fantasy. But almost the only person in the government knew that this would be the case - L. A. Kostandov. He devoted all his energy, organizational talent and eloquence to convincing the authorities: it is urgent to put the chemical industry on its feet and not spare money and effort for this, because it is this industry that will pull the entire economy of the country forward.
Kostandov not only understood and deeply felt the unlimited possibilities of chemistry, but with his knowledge he could break any skeptic. He never tired of repeating that “caring about chemistry is not an end in itself, not a matter of fashion or economic conditions. Chemistry and the chemical industry is one of the key positions of the productive forces of any country. Without this, the development of the oil, machine-building, electrical, electronic, light and food industries, which determine our economy, is impossible.”
And he convinced me!
Two extraordinary personalities, L.A. Kostandov and V.M. Bushuev, head of the Chemical Industry Department of the CPSU Central Committee, used all their influence on the country’s leadership to create a chemicalization program. As a result, the May Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1958 was devoted to a single issue - the development of Big Chemistry. After the Plenum, an extensive and unprecedented state program for the development of chemistry and petrochemistry was adopted at that time. In terms of scale and concentration of resources, this program can be placed on a par with nuclear and space projects.
Kostandov and Bushuev rushed into this desert with such passion and energy that it began to bear fruit literally before our eyes. In the first seven years of the program (1959–1965), enormous funds for those times were invested in chemistry - 9 billion rubles. This is almost two and a half times more than in the previous 40 years. And in the next five-year period, funding increased another one and a half times.
Kostandov, summing up the first results in 1967, noted that “the production of chemical products in the USSR increased by 2.5 times. Plastics and synthetic resins began to be used twice as much in construction, three times more in mechanical engineering, and three and a half times more in woodworking and the furniture industry.” That is, the intensive use of chemical industry products began in almost all sectors of the national economy.
This is the essence of chemicalization - to replace traditional materials (metals, wood, stone, natural rubber, wool, silk, cotton and linen), more expensive, more scarce, heavier and more labor-intensive, with new ones in numerous industries and their products. synthetic materials are light in weight, easy to process, more economical and cheaper to produce. “To contrast artificial with natural, plastic with metal, would be complete stupidity. Both are necessary for the national economy,” said Kostandov. - Plastics and metal coexist and complement each other. It’s just that the costs of developing plastics production are 100–150 times less than metallurgy.” And where possible, it is necessary to replace scarce natural materials, because this is economically justified. In the same plastics industry, production costs are very low, and this industry has practically unlimited supplies of raw materials - natural gas and refined petroleum products.
Arguments in favor of chemicalization poured out from Kostandov as if from a cornucopia. “Chemistry saves the national economy a huge amount of labor and resources, and can save much more. Literally everywhere. Take food. One hundred years ago (in 1870 - Note edit.) one person living in the village could feed another person in the city. And now, from the same area, thanks to mineral fertilizers and plant protection products, it can feed 13 people.”
“Take some clothes. Without chemical fibers today it would simply be impossible to clothe humanity. In 1969, the world produced four million tons of synthetic fibers. And wool - only two million tons. By the way, it takes about a billion sheep to shear this wool. It turns out that chemists are keeping another two billion sheep in their machines.”
“Replacing a ton of thin and semi-thin woolen fabric with synthetic fabric saves 10–15 thousand rubles (in 1970 prices. - Note ed.). No less effective is the use of chemical materials in industry, construction, and transport. The point here is not only the replacement of scarce metals with plastics, but also a sharp reduction in the costs of manufacturing plastic parts instead of metal ones. In addition, plastic polymer materials provide greater freedom to industrial designers. In many cases, the creation of new machines and devices is simply impossible without new materials.”
“The greatest savings in resources are when replacing alloy steel, bronze, and brass with phenolic press powders, styrene copolymers, polyamides, polyvinyl chloride, vinyl plastic, and polypropylene. Such a replacement not only saves labor, but also gives machines new qualities: it reduces the weight of aircraft and machine tools, railway cars and ships, electronic equipment and cars. Let me remind you that in a modern passenger car over the past 6-7 years the number of plastic parts has doubled and is now approaching five hundred.”
Indeed, the first Zhiguli cars that rolled off the production line in 1970 contained 34 kg of plastic. In 1983, the contribution of polymers was already 72 kg. Kostandov predicted 90 kg for the near future and was not mistaken! And today a modern car consists of 30% polymer materials.
Let's take pipes. The replacement of metal pipes in the national economy with plastic ones - made of polyvinyl chloride and polyethylene - became on the agenda in 1979. According to calculations, in 1980 we needed about a million tons of polymer pipes. This made it possible to free up 5 million tons of steel and save 10 million tons of oil annually. After all, the total consumption of thermal and electrical energy for the production of polymer materials is four times lower than for the production of steel, six times less than for the production of aluminum, and five times less than for the production of copper.
In those years when the chemicalization program was unfolding (1959–1980), Kostandov was the central figure in the media space. “Socialist Industry”, “Economic Gazette”, “Izvestia”, “Pravda”, “Trud”, “Stroitelnaya Gazeta”, “Moskovsky Komsomolets” - all regularly published interviews and articles by Kostandov, in which he never tired of talking about the essence of chemicalization, about her growing success. Leonid Arkadyevich spared no time on this work because he believed, and quite rightly, that constant propaganda is a necessary part of any large-scale government program, the key to its success.
It was then, in the wake of chemicalization, that it was decided to create the popular science magazine “Chemistry and Life”. The first issue of our journal was published in April 1965, and L. A. Kostandov became a member of the editorial board, along with academicians. Without any ceremony, he came to the basement at 61 Leninsky Prospekt, where the editorial board of Chemistry and Life was located for a long time and where meetings of the editorial board often took place. He was always friendly, informative, open to any conversation, and constructive. From a journalist’s point of view, Kostandov was an ideal source of information because he answered questions quickly, essentially, immediately putting his thoughts into literary form. Tongue-tiedness and slow-wittedness, as well as arrogance and snobbery, were alien to him. It is not surprising that Kostandov’s interviews and articles appeared in our magazine annually, or even twice a year.
I leaf through old files of newspapers and magazines, read his articles and physically feel the energy emanating from these texts. What a talented and strong man he was!
Of course, chemicalization did not develop in a single country. This was a global trend. In 1951–1975, world production of plastics increased by 24 times, and steel by only 3.4; chemical fibers - by 6.4 times, and basic natural fibers (cotton, wool, flax, silk) - by 1.7.
The USSR integrated itself into the world process in a timely and very successful manner and soon began to make its way into the world leadership in certain positions. For example, we overtook the United States in the production of mineral fertilizers back in 1973 and became the first in the world. At the same time, the share of complex and concentrated fertilizers was 84%. The Soviet chemical industry took second place in the world in terms of production volume. Over twenty years, plastic production in our country has increased more than 14 times. By 1980, the USSR produced 300,000 standard sizes of plastic products. In the early 1980s, we produced 80,000 petroleum-based chemical products.
All this required an investment of funds, and considerable ones. From 1961 to 1980, chemistry and petrochemistry in the USSR received about 58 billion rubles in capital investments. By today's standards, this is trillions. Fixed production assets increased 10 times, the volume of gross output of the chemical industry reached 41.7 billion rubles in 1980. The average annual growth rate of production in the chemical industry was on average 1.4 times higher than for the industry as a whole. Their share in gross industrial output has increased over 20 years from 3.7 to 7.7%.
At first, the growing chemical industry of the USSR primarily served agriculture and the military complex, which is understandable - the state must feed the people and protect them. But soon the turn came to everyday needs. The older generation remembers what a miracle nylon stockings were, and then tights made of polyamide fibers and nylon shirts. What about the first transparent plastic bags? Housewives washed and dried this miracle so that it could be used many times.
Every year, as Big Chemistry matured, there were fewer and fewer skeptics. Now no one argued with what Kostandov said. And he said the following:
“Chemical science and the chemical industry supplement with artificial materials the traditional set of natural substances used for centuries. And what is created by chemists is often superior to what is natural. It is very important. But that's not the main thing. The chemical industry, compared to other industries, makes the most complete use of processed substances, energy, and social labor. This is what makes the chemical industry one of the leading sectors of the national economy.”
It became clear that chemicalization is “an objective, necessary, inevitable process.” To increase the efficiency of the national economy, it is necessary to increase the share of chemical products in it. The higher the level of chemicalization, the more powerful and technically advanced our national economy becomes.
Summing up the results of his fifteen years as minister, Konstandov said: “A lot has been done, but even more remains to be done.” Indeed, an incredible amount has been done. In a matter of years, the USSR not only eliminated the gap with Western countries in the chemical industry, but also became a leader. How did this happen?
Industrialization
The economy is like a wheel: once it stops moving, it will fall. This applies to any industry, any production, and life in general. And chemicalization, of course. Fortunately, “the possibilities of chemical science are endless. And therefore, the chemicalization of technology knows no limits,” Kostandov argued. “It is impossible, it is impossible to stop developing chemistry either in twenty years or in a hundred years.”
The idea of constant and continuous development was the basis of Kostandov’s tactics and strategy. But development requires an industrial base, which had to be created. Then, in 1959, work on the chemicalization program began with in-depth analysis and planning. Moreover, analyzing not only the experience and trends of the global chemical industry, but also the raw materials resources of our country, the needs of other industries. In general, chemical production is a complex thing. As Kostandov said in the mid-60s, “in order to establish the production of one new substance or material, it is necessary to create intermediate products for it. It turns out that one production pulls behind it five to ten others. For example, to obtain impregnation for a Bologna raincoat, you need to make 32 intermediate products.”
What is required for chemical production? Raw materials and energy. “Chemistry is an energy-intensive production, and we are attracted to regions rich in energy,” said L. A. Kostandov. - Unfortunately, mineral deposits are not always accompanied by energy reserves. For example, not far from Moscow, near Ryazan, geologists have explored a magnificent complex of rock salt - but how difficult it is to find electricity here for energy-intensive production. It is known that all of Armenia is located on salt deposits and beautiful limestones - but their development is also limited by a lack of energy.
It just so happens that nature provides the greatest benefits - both energy and underground reserves - precisely in undeveloped “empty” areas. Here everything needs to be created anew, as was the case, for example, with the Yavan Chemical Plant in Tajikistan. This plant appeared essentially from scratch - there is no city or people there. But there is a powerful power plant nearby - the Nurek hydroelectric station. And in the vicinity of the hydroelectric power station, natural gas and huge deposits of rock salt were discovered. Here, over time, large-scale production of caustic soda and soda ash will be established. Thus, one after another, reference points appear on the map of chemistry.”
Raw materials have always been a special concern for Kostandov. Thus, assessing the prospects for the production of sulfuric acid, he clearly understood the insufficiency of the raw material base in Ukraine and therefore decided to develop sulfur production in Turkmenistan, allocating the resources of his ministry for this. Then a whole chemical complex with advanced technologies was created there.
In the same way, Kostandov sought the commissioning of the richest Astrakhan gas complex. The gas produced here contains a lot of sulfur, due to which it was possible to increase the production of sulfuric acid, which is so necessary for various industries - for example, for the production of chemical fibers.
By the end of the 50s, Tataria took first place in oil production, and in the 60s its production reached 100 million tons per year. But more than half of the associated petroleum gas produced, which amounted to about 2.5 billion cubic meters per year, was flared simply because no one needed this gas. In other words, the most valuable raw materials went down the drain in the literal sense of the word. And then, on Kostandov’s initiative, it was decided to build the Kazan organic synthesis plant and the Nizhnekamsk chemical plant.
In general, Kostandov perceived deep processing of oil and associated gas as a personal problem, although this did not apply to his department - after all, the oil and petrochemical industries were under the jurisdiction of a separate ministry. But it was the processing of oil, associated and natural gas that provided food for Big Chemistry. Even today, any thing made of polymer materials, be it plastics, fibers or films, traces its history back to the oil well.
In 1977, with a group of scientists and specialists, Kostandov attended a conference on the chemical industry held by the Soviet-American Trade and Economic Council. At this meeting, the president of Philips Petroleum, Leo John Stone, shared the following information. In 1977, the United States produced $50 billion worth of polymer and other petrochemical products. Oil with a total value of $4.5 billion was used as a raw material for the production of these products. The resulting petrochemical products were processed into products, mainly polymer ones, for the textile industry, automotive industry, agriculture, and transport. The total amount from the sale of these final products was $500 billion, that is, 100 times the cost of the original raw materials!
Kostandov liked this recalculation so much that he later often used it in his speeches, saying that “one ton of oil costs about one hundred dollars, and chemical processing products of the same ton cost tens of thousands of dollars.”
As for energy, 10% of all energy generated was then spent on meeting the needs of chemical production in the USSR. That is why Navoi, Tomsk, Shevchenko, Yavan and other cities were chosen as new large centers of the chemical industry. Jobs were created around such energy-chemical complexes and cities grew. As a result, infrastructures changed and large industrial centers were formed in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine.
Raw materials and energy are the key things for Big Chemistry. However, more factories are needed. At the time when chemicalization started, chemical engineering in the USSR was, to put it mildly, backward. This means that technology and equipment had to be purchased abroad. The money allocated under the chemicalization program was clearly not enough for this, because Kostandov’s plans were large-scale. Where can I get the currency to buy what I need in the West?
Kostandov knew how to find unexpected solutions to complex problems. He proposed and convinced the country's leaders that new factories should be built with Western money on the basis of compensation agreements with leading foreign companies. We receive chemical plants, and our partners receive the products produced at them. Agreements were prepared and concluded on the construction of the largest capacities for the production of polyethylene, polyvinyl chloride, polypropylene and other products. In particular, the famous millionaire Armand Hammer participated in the compensation agreements, with whom Kostandov personally negotiated, very tough, it should be noted.
In this field, he made many ill-wishers, envious people, and sometimes even enemies. A significant part of the prominent figures in the State Planning Committee met Kostandov’s idea and his compensation agreements with hostility, did not hesitate to evaluate them as ruinous, and, naturally, did their best to put a spoke in the wheels. But a few years later, after the launch of the first production facilities on a compensatory basis - for example, the capacity to produce 200 thousand tons of low-density polyethylene - the country paid for the purchased equipment and licenses within two years and was able to profitably export this product by creating pipe production at home , containers and household products.
The supply of large quantities of chemical products for export as payment for processes and equipment created serious transport problems. Transportation by rail was limited because it required rearranging wheel sets on the border with Europe - the Russian track is almost ten centimeters wider than the European one. The seaports did not have terminals and tanks for storing and shipping goods. And according to only one agreement with the Occidental Petroleum company, it was necessary to ship more than 5 million tons of ammonia and phosphoric acid.
Kostandov, as often happened, took the problem upon himself - he decided to build two ports at the expense of the Ministry of Chemical Industry, in Ventspils and Odessa. Simultaneously with the construction of the Odessa port, an ammonia pipeline was laid to it from Tolyatti, where several installations for producing ammonia were being built. The Occidental company pledged to purchase 3–4 million tons of ammonia and export it by sea. Over time, terminals for the export of other chemical products were also expanded.
Another fruitful idea of Kostandov is international cooperation. It is clear that it was possible only with the CMEA countries, primarily with the GDR, Hungary and Poland, but this was more than enough. Thus, by 1985, from Poland we received 43 installations for the production of sulfuric acid, each with a capacity of 400–500 thousand tons per year, from Czechoslovakia we were supplied with units for ammonia plants, from the GDR we received equipment for plants producing chlorine, chemical fibers and many other substances and materials.
Kostandov, together with his fellow ministers of the socialist countries, planned a very reasonable division of labor and a unified chemical map for the CMEA countries: energy-intensive production was located on the territory of the Soviet Union, and fine chemistry was developed in the CMEA countries - in particular, in Hungary and the GDR. Cooperation was especially extensive in the field of obtaining chemical reagents, which made it possible to provide the electronics industry of the USSR with everything necessary.
Together with chemists from the GDR, we created high-power units (at least 50 thousand tons per year) to produce high-density polyethylene. In 1975, the first pilot plant “Polymir-50” began operation in Novopolotsk. By the way, the numbers in the names of the installations precisely indicated their power. And then, under the same name, they built a series of similar installations in Sumgait and Tomsk, at the Leinaverke industrial plant in the GDR, and also sold the license to the West German company Salzgitter.
In general, Kostandov used the principle of creating joint international teams for projects many times - to develop processes for producing chemical fibers, fiberglass, polymer materials, etc. It is amazing how many Western companies, research, design and industrial, revolved in orbit around Kostandov. There was no talk of any “iron curtain”.
Judge for yourself the scale of work on compensation agreements and international cooperation. From 1960 to 1986, thanks to Western technologies, purchased licenses, equipment, and installations, about 1,200 large-scale chemical and petrochemical industry facilities were built and launched in the USSR. The total cost of these purchases was about $15 billion. In the 70–80s, 50% of the entire equipment fleet was imported. It produced 90% polyethylene, 100% propylene, 60% polyvinyl chloride, 78% ammonia, 70% methanol, 68% sulfuric acid.
Big chemistry quickly gained momentum. Already in the mid-60s, Kostandov said in his interviews that “a real taste for chemistry appeared, industries believed that using chemistry was profitable. But we cannot yet provide all the needs. According to our calculations, the chemical industry needs to develop with an annual increase of 18–20%. This means that for 1% growth of all industrial products in the country there should be a 2% increase in chemical products.” Therefore, it is necessary to increase labor productivity and production efficiency. Again a daunting task. How to solve it?
“One of the clearest ways is to consolidate production units,” said Kostandov. - Instead of 10 units, you install one 10 times more powerful. And accordingly, the number of service personnel is reduced. But this one unit must work flawlessly, the system must be absolutely reliable. I assert that without absolutely reliable equipment it is impossible to increase labor productivity several times. And it’s not just about the units themselves. How many people do we have in the repair and technical services, in the instrumentation shops! With reliable equipment and warranty service from the manufacturer, these services are not needed at all. This is a fundamental question of economics.”
And again, Kostandov was the first to raise a key issue in the development of the industry - the need for units of large unit capacity. Not because he wanted it so much, but because he saw a need for it - the demand for Big Chemistry products was growing rapidly. For example, in the 60s it became clear that there was not enough polystyrene for the manufacture of home refrigerators, electrical products, household appliances, radio and television equipment. All of our production at the Kuskovsky chemical plant and the Gorlovka plant, where there were units for 1–1.5 thousand tons of polymer per year, could no longer meet the demand on the domestic market. It was necessary to radically improve the synthesis and dramatically increase the productivity of the installations.
The same applied to polyvinyl chloride. “Reactors with a capacity of 5–6 thousand tons cannot solve the problem of a sharp expansion of polyvinyl chloride production,” said Kostandov. - We need new powerful units with a capacity of 100–200 thousand tons. This means that we want to reduce plants such as Severodonetsk, Novomoskovsk, Chirchik, Nevinnomyssk and many others to one unit. That is, instead of 20 synthesis columns in Novomoskovsk or 20 compressors in Severodonetsk, we want to install one column or one compressor.” Again, new technologies and new devices were needed. Construction again.
Ignoring accusations of gigantomania, he achieved the construction of orders of magnitude more powerful installations for the production of ammonia, polyethylene, polyesters and other large-scale products.
In the case of polystyrene, he himself suggested that scientists and specialists from the Kuskovsky plant and the Leningrad Institute of Polymerization Plastics switch from the method of complete, almost 100 percent, conversion of styrene to the method of incomplete conversion. This really made it possible to effectively use the heat of reaction and design units with a capacity of 15–20 thousand tons per year. And now a new plant has been built in Dneprodzerzhinsk to produce polystyrene with a capacity of 85 thousand tons, and even larger plants have appeared in Omsk and Shevchenko. The country stopped depending on the import of polystyrene, and the chemical industry fully met the national economy's needs for this polymer and was even able to partially export it.
This policy has fully justified itself, and it is with installations of this type that consume little energy that we now produce competitive products for export.
During the period from 1961 to 1975, the state invested 15.5 billion rubles (in those old money) in the chemical industry under construction. This is where current officials would go wild. But then this money was spent honestly and wisely. The efficiency of government investment by today's standards was fantastic. In 1971–1975 alone, more than a thousand new production facilities were commissioned in the chemical industry. Thus, Big Chemistry turned into the most important base for almost all branches of material production and became the main supplier of materials for heavy and light industry. Rocket and space technology, nuclear power plants, plastic buckets and tights - they are all children of Big Chemistry. Even today, 90% of chemical products exported from Russia are produced at installations created under Kostandov.
The science
Who is the ideal chemist? “Chemistry and Life” asked Kostandov this question in 1976. This is what he answered: “The ideal chemist, first of all, should be a creative person, capable of generating new bold ideas, seeing meaning hidden from others in the behavior of substances, in their properties. I would compare an ideal chemist with a talented composer. One of the chaos of sounds builds melodies, finding beautiful harmony. Another subordinates the world of elements to harmony and, obeying the laws of nature and intuition, combines substances in combinations that no one had thought of before. But if you always want to hear a composed melody also performed well, then the ideal chemist will definitely be expected to give clear recommendations on the practical implementation of his ideas.”
Without science, a strong industry cannot be built. Kostandov was convinced of this and never tired of repeating that “any new scientific work that is put into practice improves either the quality of the product or the efficiency of the process.” And this is exactly what our economy needs.
“Every scientist should strive to see in his work the features that make it necessary for practice,” said Kostandov. “See and show to others, prepare the work for implementation.” By the way, Kostandov did not like the word “infiltration,” which carries a connotation of violence. He was more inclined to the interpretation of Academician Yu. A. Ovchinnikov - not to implement, but to trust the development of industry.
Kostandov valued both fundamental and applied science equally and did not particularly separate them. Science is science. He believed that the development of chemistry is one of the main directions of world progress in science and technology. Statements that belittled the role of people working in the field of fundamental science, and this happened in the 70s, not only surprised him, but outraged him, although he himself was involved in purely practical matters. And when he spoke about the successes of chemicalization, he always repeated that “industrial achievements are based on the successes of Soviet science, on the research and discoveries of such outstanding scientists as N. D. Zelinsky, N. S. Kurnakov, A. E. Fersman, N. N. Semenov, A. N. Nesmeyanov, V. A. Kargin, K. A. Andrianov, S. I. Volfkovich, N. M. Zhavoronkov, G. K. Boreskov, I. V. Petryanov and others.”
“Let’s say, academician Petryanov studied aerosols and aerosol filters in a purely theoretical sense,” said Kostandov. - But aerosol filters are urgently needed by industry. And they immediately began to be released, although, believe me, no one introduced anything in the accepted meaning of the word. We literally followed the scientists and got them to answer the questions that interested us.”
By the way, all of the people listed are academicians who were engaged in fundamental research. In general, former academicians did not suffer from snobbery, did not talk about pure fundamental science and did not brush off production workers - they say, this is not for us, this is for applied scientists, we are engaged in high science here. Following the behest of D.I. Mendeleev “science should serve for the benefit of the people,” they considered it an honor to cooperate with industry. “When in the post-war years we mastered cryogenic processes based on the work of Academician Kapitsa, we did not experience any particular difficulties. If any question arose, Kapitsa immediately explained it to us on his diagrams,” Kostandov recalled.
But of course, engineering work, design work is a special type of activity without which industry cannot live. Therefore, Kostandov made enormous efforts and created a powerful branch of science - new research institutes, new design bureaus and design organizations, new pilot plants. By the beginning of the 80s, 400 thousand engineering and technical workers worked in the chemical industry, and about 150 thousand people worked in research and design organizations and pilot plants.
Each sub-branch of Big Chemistry, and there were eighteen of them, had its own research and design base. Polymer chemistry alone, for example, had large institutes in Moscow, Leningrad, Vladimir, Kemerovo, Polotsk, Donetsk, Rostov-on-Don and other cities. There is little left of this gold fund today, so in the field of scientific research in polymer chemistry, our country has been thrown back decades.
Expenditures on science in the system of the USSR Ministry of Chemical Industry were comparable to the financing of the Union Academy of Sciences as a whole. Moreover, Kostandov insisted on consolidating the scientific forces of the industry with academic and university science. It was at his instigation that industrial laboratories appeared in universities, and research programs were formed annually together with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and union republics.
It is impossible to remember that a more or less significant meeting was held without the participation of leading specialists. At almost every meeting of the ministry's board, the work of one of the industry institutes was reviewed. Moreover, on the initiative of Leonid Arkadyevich, the ministry created a corps of chief chemists who became permanent advisers to the minister, who, like the chief engineers of the projects, were endowed with broad powers. The chief chemists regularly met with Kostandov, both individually and at meetings, when they discussed complex and hot topics, for example, the program to create the Buran reusable spacecraft. Each of the main chemists tried to look more convincing, to make a more significant contribution to the overall development of the topic, and customers from the industry were looking at who to work with next on this program.
All this, of course, played a positive role in the industrial breakthrough: in 1971–1985, the growth rate of chemical production was 1.5–1.7 times higher than the growth rate of the country’s entire industrial output.
In the chemical industry, more than 50 institutes were engaged in collecting and summarizing information about what chemical products and products are needed by other industries and ordinary consumers. We carefully monitored everything that was happening in the world and were interested in the areas of application of new chemical products abroad. Thousands of people took part in this serious, big work. Without it, it was impossible to answer the most important question of economic strategy: how to properly develop the chemical industry? The need of all sectors of the economy for the products of Big Chemistry, studied at the institutes, became the outline on the basis of which Kostandov and his colleagues drew up a long-term plan for the development of the chemical industry.
Kostandov carefully monitored what was new in the West. He often tried to create new materials and technologies by analogy with Western models, relying on his industry science. That is, where it was possible to do without the participation of the West, he did it. He was convinced that if there are no new technologies of our own, then we must try to reproduce Western ones on our own. There are many stories on this topic.
This was the case in 1967, when Kostandov returned from the World Exhibition in Montreal, where the process of producing impact-resistant polystyrene using the incomplete conversion method was demonstrated. Leonid Arkadyevich, already in Moscow, drew up a rough technological diagram and asked industry designers to try to draw up a project for a pilot plant for 1000 tons per year, promising all kinds of support on his part. Done! We designed, built and commissioned a pilot plant in two years.
In 1967, after VAZ concluded an agreement with the Italian Fiat, special polymers were required. One such polymer was Delrin from DuPont. Kostandov called the director of the Kuskovo chemical plant, showed parts from delrin and asked: “Can we make the same ones so as not to pay foreign currency?” “We can,” the director replied, “give it six months, and we will give a polymer that is not inferior to Delrin.” The plant fulfilled its promise. The new polymer, called SFD, was created together with scientists from the Institute of Chemical Physics of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Research Institute of Polymer Materials (NIIPM). Kostandov came to the plant more than once, inquired about how the work was going, went to laboratories and installations, organized meetings, and gave useful advice. The main result is that Fiat accepted our polymer instead of Delrin for the production of Zhiguli cars.
When our developers came up with something superior to Western analogues or something new altogether, Kostandov always demanded that we take these products abroad. This was the case with new diaphragm-type installations for producing chlorine. They were superior in power to their foreign counterparts and consumed less electricity. Soon Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland began purchasing them, and negotiations began with French companies regarding the sale of a license.
Who set the tasks for industrial science? Of course, industry and the state represented by Kostandov. He regularly gave presentations to scientists on the challenges of scientific and technological progress in the chemical industry. These were tasks with a perspective of 5–20 years. But he dreamed of the distant future, which was a mystery to him. “How can we do such a thing: gather scientists so that they themselves formulate problems that should be solved? Let it be in the near future, let it be in the distant future. Let it even be a fantasy, as long as it is theoretically possible. If only it weren’t a perpetual motion machine...”
Control
Kostandov’s life took place during the Soviet era. He worked in a socialist economy and did not grieve about it, although he visited abroad very often and saw Western experience. Yes, he often scolded the order prevailing in the national economy, deeply worried about the incompetence of senior leaders, but he recognized that Big Chemistry owed its successes precisely to socialism. He believed that the possibilities of the socialist system were inexhaustible: “There is no such degree of industry concentration as in the Soviet Union in any country, and there cannot be. We used this opportunity well. There are no planning possibilities.” In other words, it is not socialism that is to blame, but us.
For example, one of the problems is the reluctance of enterprises to master new ideas and technologies. “There must be an economic mechanism in which innovation would be beneficial to the enterprise. But now it’s the other way around! For example, to switch to producing a new, more profitable product, a plant needs a month. But this month he will not deliver so many old products - and will not fulfill the annual plan. And no matter how he makes up for profits next year, no one will return the bonuses that the team lost for failing to fulfill last year’s plan. This means that the plant must be given the opportunity to regulate its work not only by line of the annual plan, but also by cumulative total. This is one of the necessary changes to the planning system.”
Like many other things, our capital investment planning went topsy-turvy: ministries and departments submitted quite reasonable, balanced proposals to the State Planning Committee. The State Planning Committee, often mutilating what was dictated by real needs, somehow brought them together, after which it passed it on to the CPSU Central Committee for consideration, and from there the projects were returned time after time for rework, because, in the opinion of the party apparatus, low standards were laid down there. growth rates of production volumes, labor productivity, efficiency of capital expenditures, etc., etc.
In such a situation, it was damn difficult to ensure any harmonious development of the industry. Meanwhile, it was Kostandov who succeeded in this better than other ministers. Expansive and impetuous, he knew how to prove his case with restraint, laconicism, amazing patience and rare power of persuasion, turning opponents into allies and thereby reducing countless flaws in planning.
He, being a realist, corrected the distorting mirrors of the socialist economy to the best of his ability, and often beyond that. Therefore, without any exaggeration, we can say that our chemical industry often worked successfully not thanks to, but in spite of the system, and these successes should be attributed to the personal merits of Leonid Arkadyevich.
Once, in a very high official meeting (the ministers of the socialist camp, the now defunct CMEA, were meeting), Leonid Arkadyevich told an Italian story. A believer turns to the priest: “Padre, I smoke a lot, I can’t stand without a cigarette. Is it also possible to smoke during prayer?” The priest waves his hands: “What are you doing, my son! No way, fear God! But think about it - maybe you should pray while smoking?
Probably, the ministers did not quite understand what Kostandov wanted to say by this, although they laughed. And this joke very accurately characterized the time when the “right” words were more important than the deed itself. Kostandov understood all this perfectly. He was not at all a cold cynic and, it seems, sincerely believed that if the leaders of our state had been diversely educated, talented people, everything would have gone completely differently.
The success of Kostandov as a manager lies not only in his deepest competence, but also in the fact that he loved and valued people. “To learn how to make beautiful things, you need to love people,” said Leonid Arkadyevich.
He used the principle “personnel decide everything” in his work every day and hourly. Visiting chemical enterprises in different parts of the country, he looked closely at the directors, chief engineers, heads of industrial departments of regional committees - what they could do, what their successes were. The best, whose scale and potential were clearly greater than the regional one, were taken to Moscow, appointed as his deputies, or assigned to another position on a union scale. So it was with Sergei Viktorovich Golubkov, chief engineer of the Volgograd Chemical Plant named after. S. M. Kirov and the head of the department of chemical, oil, gas and microbiological industries of the Volgograd Regional Committee of the CPSU. In 1977, Kostandov offered him the position of his deputy. He gave S.V. Golubkov control of all the special chemistry of the Ministry of Chemical Industry, and this was a gigantic area - at that time 51% of all the ministry's products were intended for military enterprises working for defense.
This was the case with Yuri Mikhailovich Luzhkov, whom Kostandov noticed at one of the industry meetings at the Polymer Research Institute. The young specialist Luzhkov (he was twenty-three years old at the time), who worked at NIIPM as a senior engineer, after that memorable meeting approached Minister Kostandov and asked: “Why did you call the meeting if you came to it with a ready-made decision?” “Yes, I came with a ready-made solution,” Kostandov confirmed. “But it was important for me to make sure that the industry representatives and I understood the tasks in the same way, that there were no discrepancies or contradictions. I'm convinced." Soon Kostandov took Luzhkov to his ministry and appointed him head of the automation department. And then, when the young specialist got comfortable in a couple of years and cut his teeth in the ministerial corridors, learned Kostandov’s first lessons, the minister sent him to a truly big new task - the creation of the country’s first experimental design bureau of automation - OKBA Khimavtomatika.
And once again Kostandov was not mistaken in his choice. Very quickly, OKBA buildings grew up on a vacant lot on Selskokhozyaystvennaya Street, and in a matter of years, 21 branches of Khimavtomatika opened and began operating throughout the country - enterprises that employed 21 thousand employees, candidates and doctors of science. It was here that modern sensors were developed and created to monitor all conceivable parameters of industrial chemical processes, and the country's first automated process control systems (APCS). And all this is the merit of Yu. M. Luzhkov, Kostandov’s student and like-minded person. Together they began to automate the chemical industry, and then this process spread to other industries, so here too Kostandov and his team were the first.
These are just two examples. There are many more similar stories. Everyone whom Kostandov took into his “general staff” were not random people, but selected, individual personnel with enormous potential. They worked together for many years, and there was no staff turnover in the Ministry of Chemical Industry.
Kostandov not only loved and understood people, but knew how to build good and productive relationships with everyone - from the apparatchik to the prime minister. Actually, this is the art of management. Good relations have never harmed business, and for the chemical industry they were vital, because the chemical industry is an extremely complex structure. Big chemistry needs raw materials, which means it needs close and effective interaction with the mining industry and petrochemicals, which was then under the jurisdiction of another ministry. Big chemistry needs energy, which means interaction with energy drinks. We need machines and devices, so we cannot do without cooperation with machine builders. Of course - builders, which means - the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of Montazhspetsstroy. We need transport for raw materials, semi-products, finished products...
Kostandov was able to link all sectors into a single scheme and make it work harmoniously. I was able to do this not only because I had a sharp analytical mind and systems thinking (thanks to education!), I was passionate about the idea of chemicalization, and I was a highly qualified manager with a huge amount of successful experience behind me. But also because in his work he always relied on people - his colleagues, like-minded people, associates. Leonid Arkadyevich was not a lone warrior. He created a kind of party of like-minded people, uniting professionals from different management levels, which made chemicalization possible in the USSR (see sidebar).
"Chemization Party" 1965–1984
The entire state system worked for the chemicalization program. Fundamental strategic decisions were made by the CPSU Central Committee. These local decisions were supported and promoted by chemistry departments specially created in the republican Central Committees and regional committees in regions with high potential for chemical development. The Council of Ministers of the USSR and the State Planning Committee provided the chemicalization program with the necessary resources. And the Ministry of Chemical Industry with its apparatus, which coordinated the work of 18 sub-sectors, hundreds of enterprises, industry research institutes, design and engineering bureaus, with the support of trade unions, brought the ideas of chemicalization to life. We can say that over 20 years, Kostandov’s “Party” was formed, the only goal of which was chemicalization for the benefit of the country. It is impossible to list them all. And yet, we considered it necessary to name at least the most important participants in chemicalization in different management groups.
Top leadership of the country
A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1964–1980)
N.K. Baibakov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR (1965–1985)
V.M. Bushuev, head of the chemistry department of the CPSU Central Committee
V.Ya. Isaev, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee (1966–1984)
Ya.P. Ryabov, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee (1979–1983)L.V. Smirnov, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers for Defense Industries, Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers (1963–1985)
D.F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Defense of the USSR (1976–1984)Ministers
S.A. Afanasyev, Minister of General Engineering (1965–1983)
V.V. Bakhirev, Minister of Mechanical Engineering (1968–1987)
K.N. Brekhov, Minister of Chemical and Petroleum Engineering (1965–1986)V.V. Listov, Minister of Chemical Industry (1980–1986)
P.S. Neporozhny, Minister of Energy and Electrification (1962–1985)
S.A. Orujev, Minister of Gas Industry (1972–1981)
N.S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade (1958–1985)
P.S. Pleshakov, Minister of Radio Industry (1974–1987)
E.P. Slavsky, Minister of Medium Engineering (1965–1986)
F.B. Yakubovsky, Minister of Installation and Special Construction Works (1965–1975)
Science - academics
A.P. Alexandrov, N.S. Enikolopov, N.M. Zhavoronkov, B.P. Zhukov, I.L. Knunyants, G.I. Marchuk, Yu.A. Ovchinnikov, I.V. Petryanov-Sokolov, N.A. Plate, M.G. Slinko
"General Staff" - Deputy Ministers of Chemical Industry
L.A. Kostandova, S.V. Golubkov, V.E. Koval, M.M. Milyutin, A.A. Novikov, N.P. Svetsov, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Chemists, S.M. Tikhomirov, B.S. Ushakov, K.K. Cherednichenko, V.L. Yunitskiy
“Active” - heads of main departments, directors of enterprises, research institutes and design institutes, educational universities
M.S. Akutin, V.K. Andreev, S.A. Astvatsatryan, M.B. Bakirov, I.M. Barsky, N.I. Basov, E.P. Batova, L.B. Butovsky, M.S. Vardanyan, V.S. Getmantsev, D.V. Gorbovsky, P.F. Dobrynin, N.I. Doktorov, S.E. Dorokhin, V.V. Zhuravlev, V.S. Zaitsev, A.A. Zuev, V.P. Ivanov, K.Kh. Kadogly, M.Z. Kaidanov, V.I. Candela, V.M. Kataev, A.K. Kirillov, V.K. Kislitsin, G.A. Kostandova, V.I. Lapshin, Yu.M. Luzhkov, V.A. Lushnikov, A.I. Malchevsky, L.G. Marakhovsky, A.N. Melkumov, V.P. Merkulov, I.N. Mormylev, A.I. Nesterenko, V.M. Niyazov, L.V. Novozhilov, E.A. Panteleev, A.G. Petrishchev, I.I. Porzhitsky, V.M. Popov, A.M. Rabinovich, V.M. Romanov, V.F. Rostunov, E.A. Ryabenko, M.P. Sedov, V.P. Semenov, V.M. Serenkov, G.V. Smirnov, A.M. Khlebnikov, L.K. Khudoyak, Z.S. Tsakhilov, M.K. Chistyakov, L.S. Shevikin, V.F. Shilov, I.G. Shimko, V.S. Shpak, N.Kh. Yusupov
Chemistry department apparatus Central Committee of the CPSU
Yu.V. Borodkin, K.A. Zakharov, G.I. Ivlev, L.K. Nedelko, B.S. Semenov, V.S. Smirnov
Apparatus of the Ministry of Chemical Industry
G.F. Artemyev, A.I. Boldyreva, N.Ya. Varakin, K.F. Vinogradov, A.I. Zlobin, I.A. Lisenko, F.P. Natarov, M.P. Fedorova, A.K. Chernyshev
Kostandov understood that tomorrow’s personnel go to school and institutes today, therefore, despite his enormous busyness, he agreed to give a course of lectures on Saturdays “Scientific and technological progress and the current state of the chemical industry” at the Academy of Chemical Protection. It was a cascade of bold and progressive statements, a fireworks display of information about advanced foreign technology from the USA, Japan, Germany, and Canada. Once, to one of his lectures, he brought a sheet of graph paper on which the territory occupied by the Kemerovo Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant was depicted to scale, and in the corner of this diagram there was a small square. He showed the area that would be occupied by modern units of large unit capacity with the same production plan. At his lectures, listeners hung on his every word and many years later spoke of the deep impression he made on them.
Yes, he could captivate, ignite, and captivate with the scale of his plans. Everyone who was involved in the whirlpool of his vigorous activity felt like participants in exceptional, grandiose events. And this gave me strength.
Leonid Arkadyevich knew how to work with people, trust them, and forgive inevitable omissions. The atmosphere of demandingness and goodwill that he created around himself was amazing. He instructed his assistants: study projects deeply, get to the essence, and do not make ill-conceived decisions. Being himself a continuous generator of ideas, he knew how to listen, quickly grasp the rational and, most importantly, bring what was accepted to its logical conclusion.
He demanded from the leaders of any department of the ministry or enterprise the ability to think and make decisions independently; he could not stand inaction, fear of responsibility, and indecisiveness of his employees. He often repeated: “Don’t run away from the problem, from the difficulty, go towards it, solve it. If you run away, she will catch up with you and knock you down. Don't be afraid to decide." And one more thing: “Extremity is now more useful than timidity, which can lead to technical lag.” He never scolded people for the wrong solution to any technical or organizational problem, but tactfully corrected them and could transfer the topic to someone else or close it altogether. But he always did it delicately, without humiliating the dignity of the employee. All his deputies tried to do exactly the same, and gradually the ministry apparatus became not a bureaucratic inert mechanism, but a thinking management body, in which many interesting people worked - analysts, unconventionally thinking specialists.
In his daily work, the principle of a person’s personal responsibility for an assignment was clearly visible. Therefore, he often met not only with leaders, but also with ordinary employees of the ministry’s apparatus, enterprises and institutes. Leonid Arkadyevich always controlled the implementation of his orders and instructions - but not by reading certificates compiled by staff members, but by communicating with the executors. He made hundreds of phone calls a day, and the industry knew that everything was under the minister's control.
Kostandov was always accessible and democratic. Leonid Arkadyevich's memory was phenomenal. When talking on a government telephone with higher-ups, he never used notes; he knew all the numbers from memory. He often called many workers and apparatchiks at the factories by name and patronymic, asked what had changed since the last meeting, how was their health, how was their family, what concerns they had, how they needed help...
During business trips, he always carried a voice recorder in his pocket and told him orders with deadlines for their completion, which he gave on the spot. Then the ministry deciphered the records and took orders for control. Everyone was amazed at his poise when dealing with major problems. He never raised his voice, and that’s probably why those responsible didn’t hide anything. They knew that Kostandov could forgive a lot, but not lies and varnishing of events.
The desire for primacy, for experimentation, for the new was characteristic of his business style, which he cultivated among his subordinates. From his trips abroad, Kostandov brought many samples of products, the production of which he dreamed of establishing in our country. And when he succeeded, he was truly happy.
Every day and every hour he taught his employees how to work by his example. I didn’t read lectures and rarely raised my voice. His sense of humor never left him. He always communicated simply, on equal terms with people, regardless of their positions and titles: no arrogance, no pressure with his authority; interrupted the interlocutor only when he was talking nonsense, but even in this case he was calm and restrained. Against the background of the seemingly generally accepted simplicity of morals that reigned in the industrial and scientific community, in the presence of Leonid Arkadyevich, everyone suddenly began to express themselves in pure literary language. Next to him, the inveterate boor became an intellectual.
Kostandov spent 12 hours a day at work, after which he continued to work at home. And it is unclear how he managed to find time to read fiction, attend theaters, go hunting, and meet with friends. How did he manage everything?
Kostandov’s employees have heard him say more than once: “Don’t think that I’m smarter than you, I just sit higher and see further.” This, of course, is not entirely true - he knew and was able to do more, and therefore did a lot for the country. By the early 80s, he created a world-class chemical industry that was firmly on its feet, which had its own engineering and scientific personnel, its own chemical engineering and its own instrument making. Kostandov intended in the coming years to achieve the best global indicators both in capital investments and in resource saving and production costs. Another ten years, and then no perestroika would break this steadily developing industry. But something happened that always happens in life - on September 5, 1984, L. A. Kostandov died, a year short of his seventieth birthday.
Last lesson
The professional activity of L. A. Kostandov, the minister and chief chemist of the country, provides a wealth of material for study, learning lessons, and imitation. But, as Kostandov said, “it’s not enough just to know the business, you also need to be able to do it.” He knew and was able.
In preparing the article, we used interviews and articles by L. A. Kostandov in the journal “Chemistry and Life” in 1965–1983, in the media of the 60–70s, as well as fragments of memories of friends, colleagues and associates of L. A. Kostandov, published in the collection “Leonid Arkadyevich Kostandov. Minister, engineer, person” (Russian Chemical Society named after D.I. Mendeleev, 1996).
VNE 28-86
------------------
Ministry of Chemical Industry
DEPARTMENTAL STANDARDS
INSTRUCTIONS
ABOUT SAFETY MEASURES WHEN WORKING WITH METHANOL
AT ENTERPRISES AND ORGANIZATIONS OF MINCHIPROM
Date of introduction 1986-12-15
DEVELOPED by the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Safety in the Chemical Industry
Deputy Director of the Institute for Scientific Work V.I. Zhukov
Head of work E.N. Iovenko
PERFORMERS S.Ya.Tarasenko, V.I.Kuzmenko
INTRODUCED by the Department of Safety, Industrial Sanitation and Nature Protection of the Ministry of Chemical Industry
AGREED with the USSR Ministry of Health (letter dated October 22, 1986 N 122-5/712-II) and the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Chemical and Petrochemical Industry Workers (resolution dated November 10, 1986 N 67)
APPROVED by the Ministry of Chemical Industry on November 25, 1986
ENTERED INTO EFFECT on December 15, 1986
1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
1.1. This Instruction determines the procedure for transportation, issuance, accounting, storage and use of methanol.
The Instructions do not contain the general requirements for explosion safety, fire safety and others, in relation to methanol, set out in SNiP and other all-Union and industry normative and technical documents.
1.2. When producing methanol, in addition to these Instructions, you should be guided by all-Union and industry normative and technical documents regulating both general safety requirements and requirements determined by the physical and chemical properties of methanol.
1.3. The introduction of technological processes using methanol or substances containing methanol must be agreed with the state sanitary inspection authorities.
1.4. The combined simultaneous or alternate use of methanol and ethyl alcohol in the same production area (shop, production) is prohibited, unless this is due to the chemistry of the technological process.
Note. In cases where such use is due to the chemistry of the process, additional technical solutions must be developed to prevent the theft of methanol.
1.5. The order for the enterprise appoints persons responsible for the transportation, storage, acceptance and delivery of methanol on the territory of the enterprise, as well as persons responsible for the supply of methanol to third parties.
1.6. Places of possible theft of methanol should be included in the list of particularly dangerous places, which are personally checked by shift supervisors, senior researchers, group leaders and other responsible persons before starting work.
1.7. If a fact of theft of methanol is discovered, it is necessary to immediately report this to the immediate supervisor, who, in turn, is obliged to report the incident to the management of the enterprise.
The management of the enterprise must take measures to notify the employees of the enterprise about the incident and prevent cases of methanol poisoning, as well as to prevent its spread within the territory of the enterprise and its removal beyond its borders.
1.8. All persons admitted to the territory of an enterprise that produces or uses methanol are instructed in accordance with the Instructions for conducting special instruction on the dangers of methanol to human health and life at enterprises of the Ministry of Chemical Industry*.
________________
* Full information about the regulatory documents specified in this Instruction is given in reference Appendix 1.
1.9. Persons registered with drug treatment centers, as well as pregnant and lactating women, are not allowed to work with methanol.
1.10. Access to a workshop (department, section, installation) that produces or uses methanol, employees of other workshops and services of the enterprise, as well as employees of third-party organizations, students of vocational schools, secondary specialized educational institutions, students of higher educational institutions, etc. carried out with the written permission of the workshop manager.
1.11. Persons authorized to work with methanol must have distinctive workwear or a distinctive sign on it.
1.12. Job descriptions of engineering and technical workers and instructions for workplaces of employees of workshops, sites, laboratories, etc., where methanol is produced or used, must set out their duties and responsibilities in terms of fulfilling the requirements of this Instruction (prevention of cases of theft and distribution methanol, cases of poisoning with it, etc.).
Note. The instructions should state that methanol resembles ethyl alcohol in appearance and odor and that methanol is a strong poison. Taking methanol orally is especially dangerous. A small dose (5-10 grams) causes human poisoning, accompanied by loss of vision, and a dose over 30 grams is fatal.
2. RELEASE, TRANSPORTATION AND RECEIPT OF METHANOL
2.1. Methanol is supplied to the consumer (third-party enterprise or organization) if it has containers that comply with GOST 2222-78*.
_________________
* GOST 2222-95 is valid, hereinafter in the text. - Note "CODE".
2.2. When transporting methanol by rail, you should be guided by the “Rules for the transportation of liquid cargo in bulk in tank cars and bunker gondola cars”, “Rules for the transportation of dangerous goods”, “Safety Rules and the procedure for eliminating emergency situations with dangerous goods when transporting them by rail”, when transporting methanol by road - "Rules for transportation of methanol by road".
2.3. Acceptance of methanol from the transport organization is carried out by a specially authorized recipient of the cargo from the enterprise, who, together with a representative of the transport organization, must check the safety of the cargo, the serviceability of the container and the integrity of the seals, as well as ensure the protection of methanol until it is accepted by the enterprise warehouse.
2.4. The consumer is obliged to ensure that ethyl mercaptan (1 liter per 1000 liters), or kerosene (10 liters per 1000 liters), or dyes (dark 2-3 liters per 1000 liters) is added to methanol to give it an unpleasant odor or color, if according to the production technology this not contraindicated.
2.5. Methanol received at the enterprise is accepted according to an act by an employee appointed by order for the enterprise (from among the persons specified in paragraph 1.5 of this Instruction), who is responsible for the safety of methanol from the moment of its receipt until transfer to the workshop, department, site, laboratory.
2.6. At enterprises, workshops, and laboratories that use methanol, strict records of its receipt and distribution must be organized.
Reception and delivery of methanol in warehouses is carried out according to fully executed receipt and expenditure documents, as a product of strict reporting, with the entry of receipt and consumption data into the linked book of the workshop, laboratory (Appendix 2), periodically checked by the management of the enterprise, the head of the workshop (department), laboratory .
The consumption of methanol is documented according to an act (Appendix 3), which is approved by the management of the enterprise.
2.7. During unloading and loading operations, railway tanks, as well as the premises in which such work is carried out, must be located in a fenced area with a security alarm. If tanks are located outside the zone, security must be posted for the entire period of unloading and loading operations.
2.8. Methanol is drained from the tanks through pipelines. Taps, valves on them, as well as pumps and other equipment used during draining and loading operations must be located indoors.
2.9. Methanol is poured into containers using pumps or siphons specially designed for methanol and dedicated for this purpose. Transfusion with buckets and siphons with suction by mouth is not allowed. Methanol is drained from the container completely, without any remaining product. Once drained, railway methanol tanks are completely emptied in a manner that prevents people from staying in them.
2.10. When spilling methanol, you should immediately fill the flooded area with sand or sawdust, remove the sand or sawdust soaked in methanol, and rinse the area with a stream of water.
2.11. Empty methanol containers must be washed with water in an amount of at least two container volumes. Washing is carried out under the supervision of a responsible person specified in clause 1.5 of these Instructions.
Washing of railway tanks is carried out in accordance with the “Rules for the transportation of liquid cargo in bulk in tank cars and bunker gondola cars.”
3. STORAGE AND USE OF METHANOL
3.1. Methanol warehouses, as well as shop supply tanks containing methanol, must have fences made using standard fence designs, equipped along the entire perimeter with a security alarm with backup power in case the main source of electricity is cut off. In the absence of alarm systems, warehouses must be guarded.
3.2. Storage and on-site supply containers containing methanol are equipped with automatic level control and interlocks to prevent overflow.
The use of measuring glasses is prohibited.
3.3. Premises for storing methanol must have metal or wooden, metal-lined doors equipped with reliable locks; light openings are protected by durable metal bars.
3.4. During non-working hours, the doors of warehouses (premises) are locked and sealed. Keys are stored, handed over and received in accordance with the procedure established by the enterprise.
3.5. Storage of ethyl alcohol is not permitted in premises intended for storing methanol.
3.6. Methanol is stored in containers in accordance with GOST 2222-78. The container must be hermetically sealed, sealed, and also have warning inscriptions in indelible paint “Methanol-poison”, “Flammable” and corresponding danger signs in accordance with GOST 19433-81*.
___________________
* GOST 19433-88 is valid. - Note "CODE"
3.7. The quantity and storage conditions of methanol or substances containing it in warehouses and workshop storerooms (meeting the requirements of paragraphs 3.1-3.5 of these Instructions) are determined by the project.
At workplaces (in laboratories, etc. departments), the amount of methanol stored should not exceed the daily requirement.
3.8. If the resulting methanol is not consumed, the remainder is delivered to a warehouse or stored under conditions that prevent its theft: large quantities of methanol can be stored in premises equipped in accordance with the requirements of paragraphs 3.1-3.5 of these Instructions; small quantities - in fireproof safes (cabinets, metal boxes), which are locked and sealed. The safe must have a warning sign: “Methanol is a poison.” The safe must be located in a room that is locked and sealed during non-working hours. Keys are stored, handed over and received in accordance with the procedure established by the enterprise.
3.9. The use of methanol is allowed only in those production processes where it cannot be replaced by other substances.
The use of methanol for the manufacture of polishes, mastics, nitro-varnishes, adhesives and other products supplied to the retail chain and used in everyday life is prohibited.
3.10. Production processes using methanol or compounds containing it must be completely sealed and prevent workers from coming into contact with methanol.
3.11. Loading of measuring instruments or production devices is carried out from stationary containers (storage, shop supply containers, etc.) using pumps, and from movable containers (barrels, bottles, etc.) using a vacuum. Manual filling is allowed only for small quantities of methanol (no more than 3 liters).
3.12. Methanol pipeline connections should generally be made by welding. Flange connections are allowed in places where valves are installed and connected to equipment.
It is prohibited to lay methanol pipelines through adjacent workshops and rooms where it is not used. Pipelines must have a slope that ensures complete emptying.
3.13. Places of possible theft of methanol (flange connections, sampling points, connections to control and measuring instruments, etc.) must be protected by locked casings, sealed and prevent access to them. The keys are kept by a responsible person from among the shift personnel.
3.14. The work permit (permit) for carrying out gas hazardous, fire, repair work on equipment and communications in which methanol was located, or for work carried out near equipment and communications in which methanol was located, must provide for additional measures to prevent theft and drinking methanol.
3.15. Laboratory work using methanol is carried out in accordance with the requirements of the “Basic Rules for Safe Work in a Chemical Laboratory”*.
________________
* The document is not valid on the territory of the Russian Federation. IPA F 12.13.1-03 is valid, hereinafter in the text. - Database manufacturer's note.
3.17. When conducting technological processes, the discharge, pre-treatment, and neutralization of waste methanol and substances containing it are carried out in accordance with technological regulations. The neutralization and destruction of waste methanol in chemical laboratories is carried out in accordance with the requirements of the “Basic Rules for Safe Work in a Chemical Laboratory”.
4. FIRST AID MEASURES FOR METHANOL POISONING
4.1. In case of poisoning, it is necessary to take the victim out into fresh air and immediately seek qualified medical help. The victim needs to be kept at rest, placed on his back, unfastened tight clothing, and allowed to inhale oxygen with carbogen.
4.2. In case of loss of consciousness with respiratory arrest, the victim must immediately, without waiting for medical personnel to arrive, perform artificial respiration.
4.Z. If methanol gets on the skin, to prevent poisoning, it is necessary to rinse the contaminated area of the body with plenty of water. If methanol gets on protective clothing, it must be removed and replaced. Workwear contaminated with methanol should be washed in warm water.
Appendix 1 (for reference). LIST of regulatory documents referred to in this Instruction
Annex 1
Information
1. Instructions for conducting special instructions on the dangers of methanol for the health and life of people at enterprises of the Ministry of Chemical Industry, appendix to the order of the Ministry of Chemical Industry of May 3, 1972 N 297.
2. Rules for transporting methanol by road. Approved by Soyuzzot on June 12, 1984 and agreed upon with the All-Russian Research Institute of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs on August 24, 1984.
3. Rules for the transportation of liquid cargo in bulk in tank cars and bunker gondola cars. Approved by the USSR Ministry of Railways on May 25, 1966 and agreed upon with the USSR State Arbitration Court.
4. Rules for the transportation of dangerous goods. Approved by the USSR Ministry of Railways on September 15, 1965 and agreed with the USSR State Arbitration.
5. Safety rules and procedures for eliminating emergency situations with dangerous goods when transporting them by rail. Approved by the USSR Ministry of Railways on December 10, 1983 and agreed with the USSR Civil Defense Headquarters on November 28, 1983.
6. GOST 2222-78 "Technical methanol poison. Technical conditions." Approved by Resolution of the State Committee of Standards of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on February 22, 1978 N 515.
7. Basic rules for safe work in chemical laboratories. Approved by the Ministry of Chemical Industry on July 27, 1977 and agreed upon with the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Oil, Chemical and Gas Industry Workers on February 25, 1977.
by workshop (department, laboratory) | ||||
Document number | Arrival of methanol from warehouse (storage) | Methanol consumption | The rest of the meta- |
||||||
Direction of consumption: name of operations, products, etc. | Number of operations, products, etc. | Norm for operation (unit of product, etc.) | Released for the entire volume according to the standards | FULL NAME. recipient | Signature received | ||||
(Business name) | I APPROVED |
|
"___"__________ 19___ |
ACT
for methanol write-off
from "___"__________ 19___
Commission appointed by order of the head of the workshop (department, laboratory) N |
||||||||
dated "___"__________ 19___, drew up an act for writing off the methanol consumed during |
||||||||
by shop (department, laboratory) |
||||||||
Name of expense (name of operations, experiments, etc.) | Number of operations | Cost code | Alcohol code | Unit | Alcohol consumption | ||||
according to the norm | actually | ||||||||
for surgery | for the entire volume | ||||||||
The main reasons and culprits of overspending | |
07.06.2016
May 29 The Russian Federation celebrates the professional holiday of workers in the chemical and petrochemical industries - Chemist Day.
In Russia, the transition from individual chemical industries to the creation of the first chemical enterprises occurred during the reign of Peter I. In the 19th century. Large chemical plants arose in the country (P.K. Ushakov’s Bondyuzhsky chemical plant, Tentelevsky chemical plant in St. Petersburg, N.V. Lepeshkin’s enterprises in Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, etc.). A favorable factor for the development of chemical production in Russia was the high level of Russian chemical science. Discoveries by D.I. Mendeleev, A.M. Butlerova, N.N. Zinin laid the foundation for the development of the most important areas in chemical science and the creation of new industries.
The development of the domestic chemical industry after 1917 was associated with the production of products for military needs. For this purpose, in December 1917, the Chemical Department was created as part of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) (RGAE. F. 3429).
As a result of the reorganization of the management system for industrial sectors, on January 22, 1939, on the basis of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry of the USSR (Narkomtyazhprom USSR, NKTP USSR) (RGAE. F. 7297), the People's Commissariat of the Chemical Industry of the USSR (Narkomkhimprom USSR) was created. The People's Commissariat for Chemical Industry of the USSR, which became the main industry department, was transformed into a ministry of the same name on March 15, 1946.
As a result of the economic reform of 1957 - 1965, when the centralized sectoral management system was replaced by a decentralized one, the ministry was liquidated.
The USSR Ministry of Chemical Industry (USSR Ministry of Chemical Industry) was formed again on October 2, 1965, and a four-tier industry management system was introduced: USSR Ministry of Chemical Industry - industry departments - republican departments - associations (enterprises).
On November 5, 1980, the Ministry for the Production of Mineral Fertilizers of the USSR was separated from the Ministry of Chemical Industry of the USSR, and on June 27, 1989, it was merged with the Ministry of Oil Refining and Petrochemical Industry of the USSR and the Ministry for the Production of Mineral Fertilizers of the USSR into one - the Ministry of Chemical and Oil Refining Industry of the USSR.
The history of the chemical industry of the USSR is presented in detail in the collections of the Russian State Archive of Economics, including:
F. 349. “Ministry of Chemical Industry of the USSR (Minkhimprom USSR)” (1939-1958, 5939 items)
F. 459. “Ministry of Chemical Industry of the USSR (Minkhimprom USSR)” (1965-1989, 29595 items)
F. 3106. “Main Directorate of the Chemical Industry (Glavkhimprom) of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR” (1921-1922, 1926-1930, 1817 storage units)
F. 8124. “All-Union Association of the Chemical Industry (Vsekhimprom) Supreme Economic Council of the USSR” (1929-1931, 525 items)
F. 173. “State committees of the chemical and petrochemical industry” (1958-1965, 4155 items)
F. 9485. “Institutions for the management of the industry of chemical-plastic masses” (1930-1953, 1956-1957, 796 storage units)
F. 8311. “Institutions for the management of the paint and varnish industry” (1918-1973, 707 items)
F. 2092. “Institutions for the management of the anil-dye industry” (1918-1937, 1939-1957, 1028 items)
F. 3971. “Institutions for the management of enterprises of the phosphate fertilizer and nitrogen industry” (1918-1919, 1922-1925, 1932-1957, 1693 items), etc.
- (RGAE. F. 1102, 400 documents)
Deputy People's Commissar-Minister of Chemical Industry of the USSR, Doctor of Technical Sciences A.G. Kasatkina (1903 - 1963) (RGAE. F. 319, 23 items)
Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Chemistry, Minister of Oil Refining and Petrochemical Industry of the USSR V.S. Fedorov (RGAE. F. 737, 487 storage units)
Doctor of Chemical Sciences I.N. Zaozersky (1887 - 1992) (RGAE. F. 199, 13 items archived)
Doctor of Chemical Sciences O.E. Zvyagintseva (1894 - 1967) (RGAE. F. 728, 115 items)
Doctor of Chemical Sciences A.A. Zinoviev (1891 - 1968) (RGAE. F. 136, 233 items archived)
Doctor of Technical Sciences, Chemical Technologist P.M. Lukyanova (1889 - 1974) (RGAE. F. 501, 144 items)
Doctor of Technical Sciences, Chemist B.A. Sass-Tisovsky (1883 - 1968) (RGAE. F. 207, 40 items)
Chemist-technologist E.A. Borskoy (1898 - 1976) (RGAE. F. 677, 89 items archived)
Khimika N.M. Romanova (1886 - 1967) (RGAE. F. 163, 146 items)
Artist-technologist, specialist in the development of new types of paints N.G. Bonch-Osmolovsky (1883 - 1968) (RGAE. F. 667, 35 units, archive)
Doctor of Chemical Sciences V.V. Feofilaktova, Doctor of Chemical Sciences Z.F. Andreeva, chemical engineer S.I. Butusova, People's Commissar of the Chemical Industry M.F. Denisov, Deputy People's Commissar of the Chemical Industry N.S. Zheleznyakov, chemist I.A. Kablukov (as part of a collection of documents of chemical industry workers, RGAE. F. 186, 233 items).
Ministry of Mineral Fertilizers CCCP
(CCCP Mineral Fertilizers) is an all-Union ministry that manages the production of all types of mineral fertilizers, chemicals. plant protection products, chemicals feed additives and certain types of chemicals. products. Established in 1981. Before the formation of the Ministry of Fertilizers CCCP Mining. enterprises for the production of mineral fertilizers were part of the Ministry of Chemicals. industry CCCP.
The management will enrich the mining. enterprises are carried out by the Ministry through everything. production associations "Soyuzgorkhimprom", "Soyuzkali" and "Soyuzsera". As part of the CCCP Mineral Fertilizers, there are 41, 20 mines with underground mining, 3 mines for underground sulfur smelting, 2 brine mines for the development of stones. salt, 40 will enrich. factories
The CCCP Ministry of Fertilizers carries out exploration and detailed study of exploited deposits, develops technical requirements and approves, in agreement with the CCCP Ministry of Geology, temporary provisions for mineral raw materials.
Mineral Fertilizers CCCP provides design, construction and reconstruction of mining chemicals. production development and implementation of technology. processes of extraction and enrichment of mining chemicals. raw materials.
Mountain encyclopedia. - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia. Edited by E. A. Kozlovsky. 1984-1991 .
See what "Ministry for the Production of Mineral Fertilizers CCCP" is in other dictionaries:
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Founders
1. Experimental design bureau of energy technological processes of the chemical industry (OKB "ETKHIM") of the Ministry of Chemical Industry of the USSR, Moscow, 1963 -
Unit hr. 87, 1963 - 1974. Inventory of management documentation.
Historical reference
The experimental design bureau "Khimenergo" was created by order of the State Committee for Chemistry under the USSR State Planning Committee dated March 11, 1963. By order of the State Committee of the Chemical Industry under the USSR State Planning Committee dated March 19, 1964, it was renamed the Experimental Design Bureau of Energy Technological Processes of the Chemical Industry (OKB "ETKHIM") .
The bureau was in charge of:
State Committee for Chemistry under the State Planning Committee of the USSR (1963);
State Committee of the Chemical and Petroleum Industry under the State Planning Committee of the USSR (1963 - 1964);
State Committee of the Chemical Industry under the State Planning Committee of the USSR (1964 - 1965);
Ministry of Chemical Industry of the USSR (1965 -).
The bureau had branches: Minsk, Siberian.
The bureau was engaged in the development of energy technology processes, the design of devices and installations for energy technology combination and the use of secondary energy resources at chemical and petrochemical industry enterprises.
2. Research and Production Association "Tekhenergokhimprom" (NPO "Tekhenergokhimprom") of the Ministry for the Production of Mineral Fertilizers of the USSR, Moscow, 1974 -
Unit hr. 392, 1974 - 1984. Inventory of management documentation.
Historical reference
The Specialized Production and Technical Association for maintenance and energy-technological equipment of the chemical industry (SPTO "Tekhenergokhimprom") was created by order of the Ministry of Chemical Industry of the USSR dated March 27, 1974 on the basis of OKB "ETKHIM", which was transformed into the parent organization of the association. By order of the Ministry of Chemical Industry of the USSR dated July 1, 1974, the association was renamed into the Production Association "Tekhenergokhimprom", which, by order of the ministry dated June 26, 1979, was transformed into the Research and Production Association "Tekhenergokhimprom" (NPO "Tekhenergokhimprom"), which included parent organization OKB "ETKHIM", branches Minsk and Siberian, Severodonetsk pilot plant.
The association was administered by:
Ministry of Chemical Industry of the USSR (1974 - 1981);
Ministry for the Production of Mineral Fertilizers of the USSR (1981 -).
The association was engaged in solving problems of efficient use of fuel and energy, secondary energy, water resources, thermal neutralization and processing of all types of toxic waste, rationalization and optimization of production using energy means; production of experimental, pilot-industrial, prototype samples and installation batches of new equipment and means of mechanization of repair work.
annotation
Management documentation.
Charters of the association and bureau. Orders from higher organizations. Orders and instructions of bureaus, associations on their main activities. Minutes of meetings of the Association's Board of Directors. Minutes of meetings of the Technical and Economic Council and its sections. Thematic plans for research and development work. Plans for the creation and implementation of new technology. Annual statistical reports on the implementation of research and development plans. Annual reports on scientific and technical activities. Documents on scientific and technical cooperation with foreign countries. Documents on participation in VDNH, international exhibitions and fairs. Reports on core activities and capital investments. Statistical reports on personnel. Staffing schedules. Minutes of meetings of the council of the primary organization of the VMO named after. D. I. Mendeleev. Documents of the local committee.
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